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Abstract 
Nationally, there appear to be clear arguments for and against Prevent, the 
government strategy to support the Muslim community in tackling violent 
extremism.  It is a strategy that requires local partnership delivery in the same way 
that community cohesion policy and strategy does. However, it has been viewed 
as a police led agenda, which some feel has actually damaged the cohesion that 
existed between communities and local authority partners. The legacy is that the 
criminal justice, education and health service are all now participating in the 
strategy to varying degrees, against considerable scepticism and mistrust from the 
community that the strategy seeks to support. Community cohesion remains core 
to the local authority focus and it is closely aligned to a variety of strategies 
Prevent being one amongst them.  
 
National analysis has developed some useful commentary considering the 
strategy’s effectiveness, but locally, empirical research remains limited.  An 
understanding of a local Muslim community view is fundamental in establishing 
effectiveness of policy, feelings of alienation, or acceptance of Prevent.  Likewise, 
the views of those engaged in its delivery are vitally important.  Once 
documented, these views may provide some useful checks and measures.  They 
may provide parties with an additional dialogue assisting in increasing community 
resilience and cohesion. It is hoped that this paper may be used as a reference 
document for all engaged in community cohesion and Prevent and as a platform 
whereby local Muslim views can be used to redirect local policy where necessary 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is therefore to examine what community cohesion 
is in the context of national and local delivery to Muslim communities; examine 
what effect the former and current Prevent strategies had and are having; and with 
empirical evidence question what effect Prevent has had on local community 
cohesion for the Muslim communities of Bedford’s two towns.   
 
The paper will conclude that Prevent has been and remains a mistrusted policy.  A 
policy, that has gone some way to increasing Muslim community engagement; but 
one that is also shunned and sometimes seen as misguided. It will be seen that 
Muslim community cohesion policies can work in conjunction with Prevent, but 
that Prevent remains controversial, whilst cohesion policies retain greater respect 
and acceptance.  
 
It will also show that in general the Prevent strategy has positively guided police 
and partnership work and that it has taken on a new momentum in the form of 
‘safeguarding’, with the revised strategy becoming far more community owned.  
 
It also shows that there is little evidence to show that Prevent itself has damaged 
local community cohesion.  Other political influences have, however, caused 
considerable damage in Bedfordshire.  It is seen that through Prevent, a 
mechanism exists to monitor and address community tensions; formalise 
engagement, empower local Muslim community groups and inform partner 
agencies where vulnerabilities may exist thereby protecting communities and in 
the long term community cohesion.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Aim of the dissertation and how Prevent and community cohesion are 
linked. 
 
This is perhaps an unusual dissertation for an MA in Islamic Studies - not drawing 
from the many cultural, religious or historical aspects of Islam.  Rather, it looks at 
where the Bedfordshire Muslim community finds itself today; with specific 
reference to community cohesion and how the Government Counter Terrorism 
Strategy- (CONTEST) and in particular the Government Prevent Strategy
1
 may 
have impacted upon it.  It considers the Muslim community in Bedford and Luton, 
contextualising Prevent against the effects of racial, media and terrorist associated 
themes. Using available national research and local personal perspectives of those 
engaged in or receiving community cohesion and Prevent delivery, it provides 
critical empirical analysis of both the original strategy and its replacement – 
(Prevent 2).  
 
Whether one considers community safety partnerships, race relations or Prevent, 
there is an ultimate societal requirement to create a community that is fully 
cohesive; benefiting the wider society with cultural diversity, tolerance and 
understanding. Yet Prevent is viewed by some with antipathy and has been 
accused of and continues creating division within and towards Muslim 
communities. In order to establish if Prevent has affected Muslim community 
cohesion, we have to establish what cohesion policies and strategies already 
existed prior to Prevent, or which ones have been developed concurrently. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 'CONTEST’ is a European and UK adopted counter terrorism strategy established in 2003. 
Prevent is one of its four strands.  The other three are Pursue, Protect and Prepare.  Prevent 2 is the 
term provided for this revised strategy set out in a government white paper in 2011. See Appendix 
3 for in depth explanation see Home Office (N.D) The counter-terrorism strategy. [online]. 
Available from: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/counter-terrorism/uk-counter-terrorism-strat 
[Accessed November 2012] 
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Examining how the revised strategy sits with community cohesion is still a 
relatively new concept and whether there is a contemporary symbiosis is difficult 
to judge and although initial analysis suggests that it is more favourable than the 
original, it attracts animosity by association and its etymology seems to be its 
undoing. National studies provide academic commentary, against which local 
comparisons can be made.  Even though Luton is placed as the sixth highest 
Muslim population in any local authority area in the United Kingdom, local 
analysis of Prevent is limited.   It is reasonable, therefore, to comment that such 
analysis is useful in the development of future Muslim community strategy. 
Bedfordshire has experienced several severe community impact events and 
headlines such as, ‘All roads in terrorism investigations seem to lead to Luton,’2 
and these have added to fear and mistrust.  That fear and mistrust is difficult to 
remove.   
 
In 2007, a Hertfordshire University study looking at community cohesion issues, 
established that, ‘At both a local and national level the media was identified by 
the majority of respondents, as presenting a significant barrier to community 
cohesion as they focused upon negative portrayals of Luton.’3 Muslim 
communities suffer when the media associates Islam with terrorism and conflict. 
Although Islam has been usurped by radical and often violent extremists it must 
be understood that they are a fraction of the whole Muslim community. As the 
National Association of Muslim Police state in their 2009 Annual Report: 
 
One of the challenges facing Muslims is ensuring that the 
police service, media and wider public understand that there is 
a clear and unequivocal difference between the Muslim 
communities and the tiny minority that claim to be committing 
crimes in the name of Islam.  This applies to other 
communities: it would be indefensible to hold the Irish 
community responsible for the actions of a minority. 
4
 
 
                                                 
2 
Gardham, D. (2007), Town at the end of the terrorist trails. The Teleghraph. 02/05/2007. [online]. 
Available from: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1550335/Town-at-the-end-of-the-
terrorist-trails.html [Accessed August 2012]. 
3
 Greene, R., Broome, K.,. Curran, B., Diosi, M. (2007), Mapping Community Cohesion Across 
Luton. Luton Borough Council/Governent Office East of England.  
4 
National Association of Muslim Police (2009) Annual Report. p.6 
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From the first attacks in 9/11 on the New York Twin Towers, young Muslims 
have reported the feeling that they have collectively been labelled as “terrorists”, 
blaming misinterpretation of events and inappropriate use of language.
5
 This of 
course is not specific to Luton or Bedford.  It is widely commented upon by 
academics and specific Muslim associations that the media in fact, create 
controversy where it need not exist.  The media has associated Jihad with Islamic 
fundamentalism, fuelling Islamophobia
6
, which has divided opinions from within 
and without the Muslim communities.  Without better community cohesion, 
limited integration may, create the danger of media speculation becoming 
accepted as the truth.  In reality, there are huge inroads into many community 
cohesion programmes. Therefore, efforts from within and without the Muslim 
community to establish safe and productive environs need greater exposure if we 
are to encourage healthy positive debate and change.   
 
The media and academia is also critical of the Prevent strategy. As stated in the 
National Prevent Annual Report 2010/11. ‘During the year we have seen much 
public and media debate and criticism about Prevent. We have also seen media 
claims that Prevent is nothing more than a spying tool.’7 Prevent is certainly guilty 
of originally being wrapped in government security marking, making it at times 
difficult to explain fully outside of police circles.  But we have to balance its 
positive aspects and understand that former barriers are being removed.  The 
Home Office and the police have listened to criticism and are addressing Muslim 
community grievances. Innes et al comment, ‘..new methods for doing counter-
terrorism policing have been emerging and are being implemented. Central to this 
                                                 
5 
Waterhouse Consulting Group.  Thgis group delivers training on Islamic awareness to local 
authorities and partners to assist in their understanding of cultural grievances and the Prevent 
Strategy. Waterhouse Consulting Group (2010), Lecture Notes. [Notes from Equipping To Prevent 
lecture citing Young Muslims Speak; Peace Direct (2006) , March, 2010].  
6 
The Open Society was quoted in the stating that since the 2011 attacks 80% of Muslims said that 
they  had been subjected to some form of Islamophobia and two thirds of Britain said that they felt 
they were perceived and treated differently from other groups. Frith, M. (2004), Islamophobia 
makes British Muslims feel increasingly 'isolated' in their own country. The Independent. 
22/11/2004. [online]. Available from: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-
britain/islamophobia-makes-british-muslims-feel-increasingly-isolated-in-their-own-country-
534164.html [Accessed September 2011].  
7
  Murray, D., (2010), The Prevent strategy: a textbook example of how to alienate just about 
everybody. The Daily Telegraph. 31/3/ 2010. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/7540456/The-Prevent-strategy-a-
textbook-example-of-how-to-alienate-just-about-everybody.html  [Accessed 15th January 2012]
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shift. has been a far more open, visible and overt way of conducting Prevent 
policing, compared with previous incarnations.’8 
 
This paper considers the changes that are being pursued through Prevent 2.  It 
may, however, be too early to see the benefits of this change, and it is 
recommended that further on going empirical research is considered.   Prevent 2 
looks at the wider community, trying to understand all cultures.  Continuing 
diversity and cultural influence force communities ever closer together and unless 
we continue to strive to understand each other we may face further future conflict.   
The Muslim Diaspora is intrinsically linked by one faith, which may provide the 
perception of an altruistic if only theoretical cohesion.   Islam is a faith which 
contains enormous religious divisions amongst its followers.  With cultural and 
historical differences based on the fact that Islam is represented in all parts of the 
world, its followers are certainly multi-cultural. It is a religion of people who still 
have strong links and interdependency to family abroad; Muslim networks are 
vast and therefore, susceptible to world events and politics. Across the globe, 
international aspects of Islam have regularly had a direct impact upon the United 
Kingdom.  Muslim men women and children were subject to genocide in the 
Balkans. American foreign policy supported the Israeli conflict against Palestine 
and the Gulf created tensions which culminated in later war. The ‘war on terror’ 
proposed by President George. W. Bush maintained the theory of a western 
hegemony so often quoted by Islamist extremists and there are many Muslims 
who have stated that they believe that their faith is under attack.  That is not the 
case, but the perception exists and in a battle for the ‘hearts and minds’ it is a 
massive stumbling block to repairing relations and trust.  
The United Kingdom became what has been termed a hotbed and breeding ground 
for ‘Home Grown’ terrorists.’  Lack of suitable legislation or willingness allowed 
for the open preaching of violent propaganda on British streets.  It was here that 
the early recruitment was allowed to flourish. Perhaps the government were too 
                                                 
8 
Innes, M., Roberts, C., Innes, H., Lowe, T., Lakhani, S. (2011), Assessing the effects of Prevent 
policing: a report to the Association of Chief Police Officers. p.89. London: The Association of 
Chief Police Officers. [online]. Available from http://orca.cf.ac.uk/23060/ [Accessed September 
2012].  
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worried about damaging community relations; perhaps the police were too fearful 
of being accused of heavy handed tactics.  But legislation at the time when clerics 
such as Abu al-Masri Hamza and Abu Qatada al-Fastini openly preached hate and 
violent Jihad was clearly inadequate.  It was confusing for Muslims and non- 
Muslims to see news reporting of clerics, encouraging hatred and violence to 
groups of masked Asian men, with police officers seemingly helpless to intervene.   
This was set against a drive for human rights legislation and an acceptance that 
the United Kingdom would always allow the exercise of a democratic right to 
freedom of speech.  Right wing groups argued that their voice was not heard, 
whilst anti-war, anti-government pro-caliphate and intifada Muslim rhetoric was 
allowed to go unchecked.  
 
These were troubled times, when international condemnation of Al Qaeda 
inspired or controlled terrorist activity was at the forefront of the public’s psyche. 
A perception that was fuelled by constant reminders of the war on terror and the 
emergence of right wing groups, such as the United People of Luton standing in 
opposition to Al Ghuraba or Ahlus SunnaWal Jamaah (a group associated with 
Al-Muhajiroun) and then subsequently Muslims Against Crusades (MAC). The 
rise from the United Peoples of Luton into what became the English Defence 
League (EDL), is an indication of how politically motivated and angered many 
sections of the community were in the five years following the London bombing 
campaign. Residents in Luton were incensed that a homecoming parade for The 
East-Anglian regiment was apparently allowed to be hijacked by a small but 
vociferous group, protesting against the United Kingdom’s involvement in the 
Iraq war.  Inayat Bungawala – media secretary for the Muslim Council of Britain,   
is a former resident of Luton.  He warned at the time that such activity was not 
representative of Mass Muslim feeling and would only stand to provide 
ammunition for the Extreme right wing. Muslims Against Crusades (MAC).  This 
small, but vociferous and openly extreme group of Muslim men, has been blamed 
for the rapid rise of the English Defence League in Luton.  Of course Muslims 
Against Crusades and is now proscribed.  But banning the name does not change 
the member’s politics. Such groups reform or morph in to other entities. 
Importantly for this study, these two groups have been blamed by a local 
respondent in this study as the main factor in damaging community cohesion.  
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The same respondent stated that Prevent was far less important and in fact almost 
invisible to the majority of the Muslim community. But the on-going issues 
between the radical Muslims and the right wing are experiences that are very real 
to the residents of Luton. When communities witness rioting in their town, with 
Muslim youth embattled against apparently non-Muslim and the local police sit in 
the middle attempting to maintain order, the success of community cohesion to a 
degree seems somewhat incredulous. But these are events that are monitored 
closely and interventions put in place to mitigate them.  However tension can 
reach a point where intervention is not successful and a situation remains to be 
managed. 
 
Open condemnation of terrorist atrocities and the radicalisation of the Muslim 
youth is necessarily made.  The Muslim Council of Britain as a recognised voice 
of leadership for Muslims in the United Kingdom has a duty to promote peace and 
harmony and to allay fears and potential repercussions within or towards a wide 
Muslim community.  But they do not and cannot speak for all Muslims. Sections 
of Muslim community, whilst not sympathising may empathise with the ideology 
that is seen to stand up against a multitude of worldwide atrocities and grievances 
that affect the Muslim Diaspora. There is a strong misconception that Islam is 
under attack. Also that there is a view of a ‘mythical past which plays a “large 
part in the hearts and minds” and that The glorification of the Umma, “is based on 
falsehood and a lack of academic understanding Sometimes that support is open 
and obvious and at other times it may take the form of passive acceptance.
9
  The 
more open support from some elements of the Muslim community is what 
Mascini proposes to be a part of the motivation in violent Jihad.
10
  Highly 
influential Islamic faith leaders and politicians quickly condemned terrorist 
atrocities and countered the media perception that Islam was a violent religion.   
                                                 
9
 (Name withheld) East of England Mental Health and Learning  Disability Academic Programme. 
Cambridge. Newmarket, 05.03.2013.  
10
 Mascini, P. (2006), Can Violent Jihad do without Sympathisers? Studies in conflict and 
Terrorism, 29: 2, 342-357.[Online]. Available from: 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/app/publications/Abstract.aspx?id=236417.  [Accessed May 2011] 
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The majority of Muslim men and women did not and still do not support violence 
as a way to promote their faith.  However, Prevent was failing in stopping further 
recruitment.  Seen as too little and too late, it had lost the trust of UK Muslims.
11
  
Islam touches a multitude of political and cultural spheres, often placing it in the 
forefront of conflict, whilst Islamic cultural heritage seems left out of the general 
narrative.  This lack of positive reporting on Islamic culture; achievements in art, 
architecture, science, medicine and jurisprudence creates an entirely unbalanced 
set of perceptions. Unfortunately, for many Muslims in the United Kingdom, 
certainly in the period immediately after July 7
th
 2005, Frith’s statement is 
perhaps correct, when he wrote, ‘To be a British Muslim is defined solely in terms 
of negativity, deprivation, disadvantage and alienation.’12  We all need to ask 
ourselves how we would feel if subjected to such a diatribe.   
With emphasis placed on the religious aspects of their day to day living, Muslim 
communities may at times appear to conflict with a modern United Kingdom 
secular society. Whether that transposes itself to the wearing of conservative 
dress; the use of religion in open debate, or an adherence to Shia conservatism, 
such values do not always sit comfortably with other Muslims and non-Muslim 
communities. Stereotyping of Muslims often appears to create the appearance of 
one society under Islam, with one collective view.  This is, of course, far from the 
truth with Islamic communities representing the many countries, regions and 
political or religious bias of the world. Just as those communities are diversely 
represented, their perception and interaction with the Prevent strategy will vary. 
Personal experience will have enormous impact on individuals and community 
groups, which is why empirical evidence is so valuable. National comparisons can 
be useful, but many Muslim communities face specific issues and need to be 
examined locally.
13
   
                                                 
11
 Bunglawalla, I. (2009) On the Verge of Losing the Plot:  UK government rethinks its approach 
to Extremism.  http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/satellite?c=Article_C&cid=248187985394 & 
pagename=Zone-  English-Euro_Muslims%2FEMELayout [accessed online December 2011] 
12
 Frith, M. (2004), Islamophobia makes British Muslims feel increasingly 'isolated' in their own 
country. The Independent. 22/11/2004. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/this-britain/islamophobia-makes-british-muslims-feel-
increasingly-isolated-in-their-own-country-534164.html [Accessed September 2011]. 
13
 Roberts, C. (2010), conversation to Ouston, M. (May 2010)  
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The data return for this study is relatively low and may not be seen academically 
to stand up to scientific scrutiny.  However it is an honest response to some of the 
contemporary attitudes in Bedfordshire.  It is perhaps too easy, when one is 
engaged in Prevent delivery, to believe that others share the same level of interest 
and understanding.  As stated, this is subject to variance. To state that Luton and 
Bedford Muslims are overly concerned with the Prevent agenda or even 
community cohesion is far too simplistic.  Barltrop, writes that the issues that 
affect Muslims across Europe are varied. With some: 
..having a main interest in Turkey, whilst others Kashmir or Iraq; for 
many it is Palestine. Moreover, if the non-Muslim environment in 
Europe focuses only on an extremist segment of Muslim activity and 
opinion, it risks failing to recognise the great amount of thinking 
being done in Islamic intellectual circles.
14
 
 
For many, Prevent will have had no direct impact at all.  A respondent to the 
Muslim community questionnaire stated that he believed that most Muslims in 
Luton and Bedford had not heard of Prevent or if they had heard of it, it meant 
very little to them or their families.  He went on to say that it was generally only 
those engaging with the police or local authorities on a variety of issues already 
that would have been exposed to how the strategy works.  
 
The concerns of many within the Muslim community in Bedfordshire will be as 
elsewhere, concentrated on domestic and employment issues, education, crime 
reduction, welfare and finance. The antithesis of this is that Prevent has been a 
constant in the minds of many within Muslim communities across the United 
Kingdom Muslim networks, creating a deep knowledge of its complexities and 
impact locally.
 15
There are many Muslims in Luton and Bedford who have had to 
work with Prevent for some years and have developed a deep understanding of its 
negative and positive impacts. They face obvious and reported associations with 
extremists, some of whom have been actively linked to terrorist activities and as 
                                                 
14
 Barltrop, R. (2003), Muslims in Europe, post 9/11: Understanding and Responding to the 
Islamic World., p.24., St. Anthony’s College and Princeton University. [online]. Available from 
http://www.sant.ox.ac.uk/ext/princeton/Report.pdf  [Accessed June 2011]. 
15
Innes, M. et al (2011). op cit. p.7.  ‘The evidence suggests that many Muslims hold quite 
complex and sophisticated views about the Prevent programme.  Frequently, across the course of a 
single interview, community representatives talked both positively and negatively about their 
encounters with Prevent.’  
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such, the community continues to experience negativity by that association. The 
changes in Prevent will hopefully be more acceptable to all Muslim groups and 
extensive inroads into strengthening the Muslim community have developed 
relationships between local authority partners and the community.  As elsewhere 
in the United Kingdom as Prevent moves forward in a revised form, the 
Government hopes for a delivery within the community that fits in with the ‘big 
society’ vision.16   
 
Considering how Prevent is viewed by Muslim communities Innes et al
17
 
comment that there are three defined groups for consideration around the Prevent 
strategy.  At one end of the spectrum, there are the opponents who consider it a 
failure and remain suspicious of it.  At the other end is a group that is engaged 
within its delivery and therefore, promote it. Then the middle ground, are a, ‘large 
group of ‘non-aligned’ Muslims, whose views shift according to the unfolding 
events.’18 The empirical evidence for this paper is drawn from across all three 
such groups. It has proven though that this middle group is extremely difficult to 
access for research. Where do they sit on interaction with the authorities? Do they 
want association with either the pro or anti-Prevent lobby or are they like most 
other people just getting on with their daily lives?  Engaging with the whole 
community is sustainable, but roles and profiles are key.  Relationships can be 
damaged and researching as a police officer has proven to be difficult and 
certainly challenging.   
 
The National Prevent Annual Report 09/10 states that, ‘Prevent will only have an 
effect if, together, we continue to build trust and confidence through renewed and 
consistent engagement.’19 Regaining that trust within the Muslim community is 
difficult. Prevent has been reported to create alienation within Muslim 
communities and threatens to, ‘undo a number of good initiatives that contribute 
to community cohesion because of the link to counter terrorism.’20 In 2008, 
                                                 
16
 Bartlett, J., Birdwell J. (2010), From suspects to citizens: Preventing violent extremism in a big 
society. London: Demos. 
17
 Innes M., et al. (2011) op cit., p.7. 
18
 ibid., p.7. 
19
 Association of Chief Police Officers (2009/2010). Prevent Annual Report., London: Home 
Office. p.6 
20
 Bartlett J., Birdwell J. (2010) op cit., p.3. 
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Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke stated that community engagement can only 
be achieved by working with and for the community and not directing it.  This is 
absolutely correct and is the bedrock of Prevent 2.  But, at the time, Clarke was 
the head of the National Counter Terrorism Command. The question has been 
asked, why him and not a senior police officer who leads on community 
cohesion?   Such association caused, as it does now suspicion of alternative 
agendas. 
 
It is a widely held belief, that the police should not have had such strong 
ownership of Prevent. It must be a facilitated process, with the Muslim 
community having the greatest say in protecting themselves. If the simple 
consideration of seeking clarity from the local Muslim community as to how they 
want Prevent to work within their community is not addressed, then the entire 
strategy is likely to be unsuccessful. It may always be viewed by some as an 
imposition of the government or police and partner agencies views on a 
community, with limited consultation.  This consultation does however exist with 
engagement officers from the police and local authority and that consultation has 
extended to the research for this paper. 
 
The methodology behind this paper rightly highlights both rationale and caution.  
It necessarily defines the transparency of the process and relevance to on-going 
complexities surrounding Luton in particular. Ethical issues demanded by The 
University of Wales Trinity St. David’s and Bedfordshire Police have been fully 
addressed and great care has been taken to provide anonymity to participants who 
have agreed to be interviewed or answer questionnaires. Engagement with those 
involved in the delivery of Prevent, as well as those whose role it is to develop 
cohesion policy has been crucial; as has been the assessment of local community 
tensions.
21
 To in any way jeopardise existing progress would be disastrous and so 
the greatest care has been taken to ensure checks, measures and constant approval.  
                                                 
21
 Luton experiences many peaks in community tension because of the presence of groups at 
opposing ends of the political spectrum.  The English Defence League and ultra conservative 
Islamic groups continue to voice their concerns and opinions in public.  It should be remembered 
however that neither necessarily perhaps express the opinions of most of the residents of 
Bedfordshire. But they are able to shout the loudest!  
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Prevent engagement and community cohesion; continue to be extremely important 
and often critical in a county, where the Muslim population is so high.  The 
Bangladeshi and Pakistani population are far in excess of the national average.  
Although demographic data is not analysed in depth within this paper, it is 
detailed within appendix 4 as useful reference for subsequent analysis. Data from 
the 2001 census has been enhanced with Mayhew and Waples’ 2011 study of 
Luton.
22
 Importantly, their data shows a dramatic increase in the Asian 
population, which far exceeds the expectations of earlier census analysis.  
Unfortunately this data does not provide analysis of faith orientation.  
 
If one takes into account that Bangladesh
23
 and Pakistan
24
 predominate the 
country of origin for Bedfordshire Asians and that 92% – 98 % of religious 
adherence from those countries is known to be Islamic, then we may assimilate an 
extremely high Muslim adherence in Bedford and Luton. Demographics have had 
a direct influence upon what government funding was initially awarded to the 
borough councils for cohesion work under what is termed ‘Pathfinder.’  
Directly assessed on Muslim populations, it subsequently allocated available 
funding for Prevent intervention policies.
 25
  Critically, funding for Prevent is one 
of the issues of contention raised by members of the Muslim community as well 
as those outside of it.   
 
Nationally, that criticism has been large enough to warrant freedom of 
information requests by the Taxpayers Alliance, who have summarised that, ‘it is 
                                                 
22
 Mayhew, L.,Waples, S. (2011), The Growth and Changing Complexion of Luton’s Population.  
Luton: Mayhew Harper Associates Ltd. 
23
 Department for Communities and Local Government (2009) The Bangladeshi Muslim 
Community in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities. London: Change Institute, 
p.7. [online]. Available from: http://www.swadhinata.org.uk/document/Bangladeshi_Muslim.pdf 
[Accessed December 2011]. 
24
 Department for Communities and Local Government (2009) The Pakistani Muslim Community 
in England: Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities. London: Change Institute, p.7. [online]. 
Available from:  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120919132719/www.communities.gov.uk/documents
/communities/pdf/1170952.pdf [Accessed December 2011]. 
25
 ‘The PVE Pathfinder Fund, launched in February 2007, represented the first stream of funding 
under the Prevent Strategy. In 2007/08 the Safer and Stronger Communities Fund allocated £6m 
across 70 local authorities17 with Muslim populations of 5% or more.’ 
Youth Justice Board. (2012). Process Evaluation of  Preventing Violent Extremism Programmes  
for Young People. [online]. Available from: 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/research-and-analysis/yjb/preventing-violent-
extremism-process-evaluation.pdf [Accessed May 2012]. 
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unrealistic to expect councils to know which groups are ‘moderate’ and therefore 
suitable for funding.’26  A criticism has existed for some time that some of the 
funding has been inadvertently delivered to groups which support extremism 
because of a lack of understanding of the networks that exist. Also groups that are 
not representative of any specific religion have complained that Muslims have 
received too much funding while they receive nothing.   
Successful community cohesion needs to be inclusive of all groups within a 
geographical area.  It is wider than Prevent, which is just one part of that much 
larger holistic approach to ensuring that all community needs are met.  Cohesion 
strategies were in place within local authority and government in advance of 
Prevent and although its impact should not be underestimated, Prevent is only one 
aspect of governance.  Nevertheless it receives the greatest scrutiny and certainly 
considerable funding streams.  
Amongst the high levels of criticism of Prevent, under closer scrutiny it has 
brought clear benefits for the local Muslim communities.  Those communities are 
empowered, politically represented, better funded and have a considerably higher 
profile than they have achieved before in the United Kingdom.  Islamic awareness 
has achieved considerable academic as well as vocational relevance especially 
across the public sector sphere.   
 
A critical analysis of the effect Prevent has had on Muslim communities is 
examined within this paper and as one would expect for such recent strategy, 
contemporary analysis provides excellent commentary from primary sources 
experiencing any impact first hand. As the Prevent strategy evolves, we are in a 
strong position to analyse impact and as can be seen already, positively influence 
future development.  A lack of consultation and engagement has been seen to be 
critically damaging.  Prior to the Prevent 1 issues, consultation has been criticised. 
Spalek et al., comment from the reports around the social unrest in Bolton and 
Bradford in 2001, where policing was forced upon communities with little 
                                                 
26
 The TaxPayers’ Alliance (2009), Council Spending Uncovered II: No.5: THE PREVENT 
STRATEGY. [online]. Available from: http://www.taxpayersalliance.com/prevent.pdf [Accessed 
December 2011]. 
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consultation.
27
 Prevent 1 was championed by the Government and the Home 
Office as an effective method of preventing the radicalisation of British Muslim’s 
by Islamist extremist elements. In general terms though, it required extensive 
amendments which have come about through criticism such as:  ‘In the past few 
years, it has spent millions of pounds trying to prevent Muslim 
radicalisation….was flawed from the outset and as the Communities and Local 
Government Select Committee warned yesterday, the efforts made could be 
backfiring.’ 28   
 
It is not just the Muslim community members that criticise Prevent 1.  Officers 
and staff engaged in delivery of cohesion or Prevent have stated that role profiles 
and titles have changed in accordance with the funding, that is directly attributed 
to their given work-streams.  Hate Crime officers and those with cohesion 
portfolios have become Prevent Engagement Officers, which they have felt has 
been to the detriment of previous good work. This has been seen to be especially 
so with the title of ‘Prevent Officers’, where existing cohesion trust and progress, 
has been stated as hampered with a suspicion because of the whole Prevent 
agenda and in particular the ‘Prevent’ word.  Consequently their views have been 
placed within this research and show many doubts about the way in which Prevent 
1 has performed.  
 
From the research for this paper though, it is clear that the officers and staff 
engaged with community cohesion and Prevent in Bedfordshire are professional 
and committed to ensuring success.  There is a positivity that is tangible and with 
excellent established relationships in the local community the development of 
Prevent 2 and community cohesion may be seen to grow together.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27
 Spalek, B., El-Awa, S., McDonald, L Z., Lambert, R. (2009), Summary and Full Report: Policy-
Muslim Engagement and Partnerships for the Purposes of Counter-Terrorism: an examination. 
doi:10.1017/S147474640999025X. Birmingham: University of Birmingham. p.7.  
28
  Murray, D. (2010), op cit. 
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CHAPTER 2:  METHODOLOGY 
 
 
2.1 Biography of the student in the context of established Prevent   
      Delivery. 
 
Consultation exercises to consider the scope of this research began in March 2011 
and prior to the nationally commissioned paper being published. In considering 
whether this seemed too close to that study, its author was spoken to at a Prevent 
Conference in Reading and the lack of localised data created an important 
motivation to continue with the Bedfordshire study. It has been agreed through 
Prevent leads; ensuring that the participants fully understand that this is open and 
honest academic research for the improvement of future cohesion work, which 
compliments established work-steams and avoids creating additional tension. This 
dissertation will be available for reference by officers or staff engaged with 
community cohesion and Prevent.  
 
As a serving police officer the author has worked within a variety of communities 
and from 2005 onwards, this policing concentrated in the two areas of the 
Hertfordshire and then Bedfordshire that received Pathfinder funding. He has 
been responsible for the delivery of Islamic Awareness to police and prison 
officers and staff, as part of the role of Prevent engagement.  Such close 
association with the community and the relevant policing strategies has allowed 
him to participate in the initial Prevent launch in 2007 and its development, 
through the 2009 review and the revised programme in 2011.   
 
Working within a Counter Terrorism environment brings with it considerable 
difficulties in gaining trust from communities which, as stated may already feel 
the subject of targeting and being spied upon.  It is hoped; therefore, with the 
assurance of anonymity and using the network of Prevent engagement officers as 
a secure and safe conduit for the passage of the questionnaires, participants will 
have provided answers that really express what issues they feel need addressing 
and not ones that they feel are safe to make. 
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There is a considerable degree of effort from many people to ‘mend bridges’ and 
build trust.  Therefore the author has been particularly careful that this research 
does not undo that good work.  Openness and honesty as well as carefully sought 
guidance, has been at the heart of this paper, such is the fragility of relationships.  
As well as ethically necessary under the terms of the University, anonymity 
afforded to participants is critical to its success and ensuring on-going trust.  The 
security of the questionnaires and the format of response analysis are all aspects 
which had to be placed before the prevent leads in Bedfordshire Police as well as 
The University of Wales Trinity St. David’s’ Ethics committee.  Criticism of 
Prevent is nationally reported, but individuals have expressed a fear that to openly 
criticise Prevent to the police may be perceived as an acceptance of extremist 
views.  That is not appropriate or true within a democratic society, but it is still a 
fear that has to be considered. 
 
2.2 Problem Considerations 
The threat to the security of the United Kingdom in part has been seen to have 
come from, as well as being directed towards, the Muslim community.  That has 
created and continues to cause tensions and fear across, not only Muslim 
communities, but also a variety of other community groups. Prevent can be 
interpreted in various ways and whether one is involved in its delivery or a 
recipient of its programmes the underlying message appears to be that it is a 
police agenda and more specifically a counter terrorism tool. 
 
The early tasking through Prevent work required a community mapping exercise, 
which established Mosques, madrasas, meeting places, travel facilitation and other 
aspects of Muslim community life.  This created immediate suspicion and 
accusations of intelligence gathering across much of the Muslim community and 
within the media, which has remained to the present. Originally called the Richer 
Picture, this strand of information gathering lead into what is known as the 
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counter terrorism local profiles.
29
  To fulfil the strategy, one must consider, that 
without knowing what was already in existence, the police would not have been 
able to establish where the threats and vulnerabilities lay.  It is easy to see how the 
Muslim community felt that they were being spied upon.   
 
If one engages with Prevent, there may be assumptions by others within the wider 
Muslim community that an issue with violent extremism exists and cannot be 
controlled by the community elders, creating shame.  Innes et al have confirmed 
this, ‘A key consideration here is negotiating with the community about how they 
want the problem to be solved. In some of the scenarios they might accept overt 
law enforcement interventions, but on many occasions they appear to prefer 
alternative, less visible, ways of dealing with the issue.’ 30   
 
The use of questionnaires brings with it a degree of error and in this research it 
must be borne in mind that the study has only been able to reach a small 
representative group who are concerned with the provision of both Prevent and 
community cohesion.  The question as to how representative they are of local 
Muslim communities can only come from local knowledge and experience. They 
are, however, a clear voice with considerable understanding of local feelings and 
tensions, possessing a good knowledge of the Prevent programme and its impact.   
A difficulty faced for the data gathering, is that those who wish to engage in 
Prevent are likely to be the same who frequently engage already with Police and 
local authority.  They are more likely to be the ones with a motivation to address 
issues through committees and are already connected. The question may remain 
about the views of those less connected. 
 
 
 
                                                 
29
 Her Majesties Inspector of Constabulary (2009), Prevent, Progress and Prospects. p.p.8–
9.[online]. Available from: http://www.hmic.gov.uk/media/prevent-progress-and-prospects-report-
20090622.pdf [Accessed May 2012].  
30
 Innes, M., et al.(2011) op cit., p.39 
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2.3 Considerations for the letter of introduction  
The letter
31
 was peer reviewed by the engagement officers and the final generic 
version was sent to both community members and engagement officers and staff. 
The office from which the author works was stated to maintain the level of 
honesty and openness. Explaining that the author is engaged within the Counter 
Terrorism Unit from the outset set a term of engagement. If recipients felt strongly 
about that particular fact they could either challenge the methodology, approach 
the author direct or refuse to participate. 
The worst scenario would be to fail to disclose the study was not being conducted 
by anyone with a police or counter terrorism connection and then subsequently 
that became knowledge.  Again, this could open a suggestion of an intelligence 
gathering exercise which would be critically damaging to local police and Muslim 
community relationships. It was also appreciated that the responses received may 
be from the most vociferous opponents of Prevent.  Yet again it is difficult to 
establish if these voices are widely representative. 
 
2.4 Questionnaire of those engaged in the delivery of the Prevent strategy 
and engagement with local Muslim communities 
 The questionnaire for staff and officers
32
 within the police and partner agencies 
provided examples of how Prevent 1 had made their engagement far more 
difficult and it was important that this evidence was captured.  These 
professionals validated many responses from the Muslim community members.  
There are three questions concerning issues that caused problems from Prevent 
and one which looks at any the positive aspects in relation to enhancing 
community cohesion. This is based on previous conversations which showed a 
clear level of disquiet from these officers around the strategy.  
 
                                                 
31
 Appears as Appendix 1.1  It is generic being appropriate for both police and prevent delivery 
staff and officers as well as members of the Muslim community. 
32
 Appendix 1.2 
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2.5   Questionnaire for Members of the Muslim community 
 This set of questions
33
has been distributed through already existing engagement 
networks as a bundle which included the ethics rationale and the letter of 
introduction.  Respondents were asked to provide details of the town in which 
they live and work and how long in residence.  They are also asked about 
experiences of growing up as a check and measure to perhaps later consider if 
grievances and experiences produce any commonality in the response provided.  
It is an interesting concept, to raise the question of community.  Whether the 
recipients see themselves as part of a wider community with multi-faith and multi-
ethnicity or only see themselves within the Muslim group, may indicate further 
cohesion work streams.  Clearly some people will have more experience of the 
strategy than others.  It was expected that for several responders the Strategy will 
have had little obvious effect on them or their families in both the positive or 
negative.  Many may not have analysed its impact.  But assuming that those who 
wish to engage with this study will have discussed the questions amongst their 
peers, the responses were hoped to be at least representative.  The responsibility 
for improvements must come from within the Muslim community as well as 
support being provided from without. Drilling into specifics of the strategy as it 
stands the questionnaire asks what positive points come from either the first or 
second strategy and what the respondents would like to see removed from either.  
 
2.6 Analysing the responses to the questionnaires 
 
The analysis forms part of a chapter later in this paper. It is purposefully presented 
post the chapters on Prevent engagement and community cohesion to allow the 
reader to understand some of the terminology and strategy that those areas 
concern themselves with.  Using available literature these chapters provide a 
commentary on national implementation, difficulties and successes. Moving on to 
the questionnaire review chapter allows the reader to consider the national issues 
in comparison with the Bedfordshire local context. 
                                                 
33
 Appendix 1.3 
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CHAPTER 3:   COMMUNITY COHESION AND THE ROLE OF   
                          COMMUNITY  ENGAGEMENT  
 
 
3.1 Community Cohesion 
 
In a 2008 study concerning community cohesion undertaken at the Centre of 
Migration, Policy and Society we are advised that: 
 
The government definition of cohesion acknowledges the importance 
of equal life chances.  This Research reinforces the importance to a 
sense of belonging of addressing experiences of discrimination; and 
the constraints that unemployment and low income on capacity to 
participate in organisations and other places of social interaction.
34
 
 
In 2001 the United Kingdom faced a situation where community cohesion was 
seen as being ineffective or non-existent amongst Muslim communities in serious 
public disorder that has become termed as the “Mill Town Riots.”35  Although 
there had been reports considering the race equality issues across the United 
Kingdom including those from Lord Scarman and the Runnymede Trust, Amin 
writes of the, ‘alarm at the scale of ethnic deprivation and segregation in poor 
urban areas, growing Islamophobia and unashamed questioning of the cultural and 
national allegiances of British Muslims.’36  
 
In 2001, The Denham Report
37
 announced the intention of making community 
cohesion a Government agenda matter.  Of particular note, one finding within the 
report was that there was ignorance about each other’s communities and that 
                                                 
34
 Jayaweera, H., Choudhury, T., (2008), Immigration, Faith and Cohesion. Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. p.5.[online].Available from: http://www.jrf.org.uk/publications/immigration-faith-
and-cohesion [Accessed March 2012]. 
35
 In 2001 Oldham, Bradford and Burnley (Mill-Towns) experienced considerable public disorder 
by Muslim youth that was disaffected by poor social and economic conditions. 
36
 Amin, A. (2002), Ethnicity and the multicultural city:Living with diversity. p.2. Durham: 
Durham University. [online]. Available from: 
http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=Amin,+A+(2002)+Ethnicity+And+The+Multicultural+City:
+Living+with+Diversity&hl=en&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart&sa=X&ei=5fOHT8fsB8-
p0AXq45HjCQ&ved=0CBkQgQMwAA [Accessed March 2012]. 
37
 BBC News (2001), Race Reports at a Glance.[online]. Available from: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/1703432.stm [Accessed December 2012].  
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ignorance can easily develop into mistrust and fear through a lack of 
understanding.
38
 This was not aimed purely at what was later to be termed 
Islamophobia. But certainly it has been seen, that a lack of understanding and 
knowledge of Islamic community and culture, has added to community fears and 
concern, over what many perceive to be extremist views, but which may, in fact, 
be normal and innocuous political or religious opinion.   
 
There was also concern that ethnic groups could or would not enter into dialogue. 
In her evidence to the Committee, the Home Office Minister Fiona MacTaggart 
set out the potential role that her department wanted the police to play in working 
with communities to tackle social cohesion. To succeed in citizen-focused 
policing and better citizen participation in policing, you have actually got to 
engage with communities intelligently and sensitively – not kind of police “at” 
them but police “with” them - and respond to them.” 39  As stated before, similar 
prose would be later used by Assistant Commissioner Peter Clarke in his Prevent 
briefing material.
40
 As community cohesion includes all groups, cohesion 
building, ‘is focused upon increasing the resilience of communities so that they 
are less likely to be influenced by extremist views.’41  
 
The committee considered all aspects of society in the way they should be 
integrated including housing, education, employment, and social/recreation 
spheres. This committee’s recommendation included to consider social cohesion 
across all sections of society and not just one particular group or ethnicity. In 
Luton there had been criticism that the cohesion policy was too focussed on Asian 
groups rather than considering all sections of the society. Yet the local strategy 
makes it quite clear that it is extremely diverse.  
                                                 
38
 Home Office (2001), Community Cohesion: A Report of the Independent Review Team. 
(Chairperson: Ted Cantle.) p.10. [online]. Available from: 
http://resources.cohesioninstitute.org.uk/Publications/Documents/Document/DownloadDocuments
File.aspx?recordId=96&file=PDFversion [Accessed June 2012].  
39
 Government Cabinet Office. Office of Deputy Prime Minister (2004), Committee findings: 
Social Cohesion. Sixth report of session 2003-2004. House of Commons 45-I. Volume I, The 
House of Commons, London: Stationary Office Committee findings.   
40
 In the aftermath of the London bombings the drive for police across community policing as well 
as counter terrorism was to ensure appropriate engagement and the message was very clear in that 
police had to work with the Muslim community not police at it.  This was included in all Prevent 
briefing material that came from Counter Terrorism Command and was for wide dissemination to 
neighbourhood policing teams including Police Community Support Officers. 
41 Innes, M., et al. (2011), op cit., p.12. 
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In 2004, The House of Commons published the findings of an all-party committee 
on community cohesion.  In its summary, the committee stated that they were 
concerned that social cohesion should not be seen as a matter for the police but 
rather an issue that should be addressed through integration of local and national 
strategy.
42
   This was a particularly important point in that the police should not 
retain primacy; cohesion is a societal problem, where the resolution needs to be 
addressed and formulated within the community and all agencies that are engaged 
with those communities – certainly not just the police.  
 
The commitment to community cohesion cited by the Minister in the 2003-2006 
National Policing Plan states that: ‘The promotion of community cohesion should 
be central to the work of the police….. Forces should look to embed good practice 
for promoting community cohesion into all aspects of their work.’43 Quantitive 
data from the British Crime Survey 2004-2008 show according to Innes et al. 
that,‘…….Muslim communities are more likely to see their quality of life and 
perceptions of neighbourhood being negatively influenced by crime and fear of 
crime
44
and therefore directly linked to the preventative or responsive aspects of 
policing.’  
 
It is possible that the violence seen in the ‘Mill Town’ riots was an indication of 
the level of discontent amongst young Muslim men within certain areas of the 
United Kingdom. But it should also be noted, that where discontent amongst 
young Asian men, who were also predominantly Muslim, developed into civil 
unrest; the same demographic group represented in towns and cities across the 
United Kingdom did not replicate.   
 
Clearly there were additional factors present within the ‘Mill Towns’ which 
aggrieved the Muslim youth that were not present in Bedfordshire at that time. 
Perhaps the cohesion programme was already at a sustainable level in 
Bedfordshire and the community was strong enough to address issues 
                                                 
42
 Government Cabinet Office. .Office of Deputy Prime Minister (2004), Committee findings:  
Social Cohesion. Sixth report of session 2003-2004. House of Commons 45-I. Volume I, The 
House of Commons, London: Stationary Office Committee findings.    
43
 Ibid, 
44
 Innes, M.et al. (2011), op cit., p.70. 
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immediately to calm community tension and fear. It has been reported that the 
threatened arrival of far right-wing antagonist forced racial tension to peek in the 
northern counties.  
 
This paper does not examine in depth the causes of the ‘Mill Town’ disturbances.  
Its focus is on Luton and Bedford and in considering the Bedfordshire community 
engagement, it is clear that much success has been achieved.  That is why it is so 
important to also examine what, if anything, Prevent has done to damage its 
fragile status. The presence, over many years of officers in Bedfordshire who have 
specifically concentrated on community cohesion issues long before Prevent was 
a locally embedded strategy should indicate a recognised desire to establish strong 
resilient community trust and dialogue without the presence necessarily of counter 
terrorism rhetoric.   
 
Community cohesion programmes were in existence before any consideration of 
preventing violent extremism from the perspective of international terrorism was 
concerned.  They formed a major consideration across all local authority policies. 
Community safety policies were provided with substantial funding streams as 
outlined in a report by Stokes and Mather for Crime Concern for the period 2000-
2002.
45
  The funding was specifically aimed at all communities to tackle issues 
including ‘Keeping young people safe and out of trouble’; ‘The Implications of 
the Lawrence enquiry’ and ‘Working together better.’  Clearly therefore, these 
social issues existed and were being addressed prior to the development of 
acknowledged ‘home grown terrorists’46   
 
With the rise of violent extremism in the period 2004 onwards, it is difficult to tell 
whether community cohesion policies were simply not working nationally, or 
whether the activities of the authorities created a feeling of tension fear and 
mistrust amongst the Muslim community, which then created further anger and 
fuelled extremist rhetoric and action. Cohesion policies alone may not always 
                                                 
45
 Stokes, M., Mather A. (2002), Crime Concern. London: National Crime Reduction Office 
46
 Home grown terrorism is a euphemism for extremism that developed into criminal activity and 
ultimately the terrorist attacks on London in July 2012.  Prior to this watershed Islamist al Qaeda 
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work and no matter how effective a dialogue is between community members and 
the authorities, people remain individuals and may become politicised whatever 
their experiences. Also racism, Islamophobia and social disadvantage do exist and 
work as a force against cohesion. 
 
It is clear that a series of United Kingdom terrorist incidents associated Islamist 
extremist networks and high profile arrests in Muslim communities created fear 
and a reluctance to engage. However, engagement did continue and the criticality 
of a two way dialogue cannot be underestimated. Without this intercourse the 
Muslim community may find itself, as the Muslim Association of Britain state: 
 
…becoming increasingly isolated within Britain, which goes 
completely against the idea of trying to create a more cohesive 
society… it has to be a two way deal.  British Muslims have got to 
build bridges and be proactive in terms of integrating with the rest of 
society.
47
  
 
Efforts to provide solutions will always have opponents.  On the same theme, Dr 
Kiran Sarma addressing the Jill Dando lecture at the University College of 
London in 2006 spoke of the process of how people become terrorists and 
therefore, mitigation factors to prevent it: 
 
This complexity means that it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
accurately identify the "causes" of support for terrorism, and 
potentially fruitful initiatives that may mitigate against support 
rationales. He pointed out that in many cases the determinants of 
support are beyond our control and in others addressing grievances 
may result in the alienation of some sections of mainstream society.
48
 
 
From 2000 onwards community impact assessment and tension monitoring was 
being conducted through local police and regional offices.  The impact upon the 
Muslim community by national as well as international events was understood.   
 
Racially motivated crime reporting exponentially increased with each Islamist 
reported terrorist incident and those fears and predicted tensions were placed in 
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community action plans as well as policing strategies to protect and reassure the 
local Muslim community in the face of considerable hostility. 
 
 
 
3.2      Community Cohesion for Luton and Bedford 
 
Luton’s Community Plan,49  is regularly reviewed and was first published in 2002.  
The issues that are central to the strategy are improving local economic, 
environmental and social well-being.  The document is a consultation paper and 
the strategy maintains its consultative process through a body called the Luton 
Forum. This strategic partnership group consist of key public, business, voluntary 
and community organisations. There are six key themes ranging from safety and 
security to dynamic and creative opportunities for the residents, but all six are 
associated with a cross cutting theme of community cohesion.  In the review 
section of the plan there are published findings, which comment on all aspects of 
crime and anti-social behaviour but the document clearly states, ‘That hate crime 
is a problem in Luton (racist, homophobic and diabolist)’50   
 
By way of increasing the contribution to community cohesion, all key 
stakeholders have representation on a sub group of the forum called the Crime and 
Disorder Reduction Partnership.  The pertinent areas for community cohesion are 
the six within the strategy, as they are there for the betterment of the lives of all 
communities across Luton.  Quite rightly they do not discriminate positively or 
negatively and no particular religious, racial, gender or nationality is mentioned.  
Having examined the strategy, it is clearly not the place to mention one particular 
ethnic or religious group and therefore, it is not surprising to see no mention of the 
Prevent strategy. Under the 2011 changes, sub-groups for community cohesion 
forms part of a more specific direction.  
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The Luton Borough Council web page  covering cohesion, makes an important 
point about the matter, of total community inclusion: 
Much of the discussion about community cohesion has concentrated 
on ethnic and faith issues, but we believe that community cohesion is 
about everyone.  We need to tackle divisions within society so that 
no groups or individuals remain disaffected and separate from 
mainstream life.
51
 
The present Government stance on what will or will not be tolerated in respect of 
views that are extreme has been clearly outlined by the Prime Minister of this 
current administration.  The emphasis on the Prevent strategy as it now develops 
is that it does not focus on the Muslim community as it has in the past, but 
considers all extremism including far-right-wing rhetoric, extremism and 
vulnerability to radicalisation from those groups. 
 
Luton has experienced large scale social unrest between members of both the 
Muslim community and right wing groups, but all sections of society suffer when 
their town centre becomes a battle ground.  There has been criticism of social 
cohesion policies being too focused on particular ethnic or religious groups at the 
expense of other minority groups. Issues associated with that particular 
community have to be addressed of course, but not at the risk of further 
marginalising others.  The Luton Borough Council response to this from the 2006 
community cohesion strategy states that to focus on race and faith leads to the 
neglect of other important issues or factors that affect the potential for community 
cohesion and this is clear in their mission statement.
52
 The key priorities for the 
strategy were to: 
 
Understand and promote respect for different ways of life; recognise 
and challenged prejudice and discrimination; promote local pride and 
an inclusive sense of belonging along with leadership and 
commitment; encourage participation and engagement; engage with 
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young people; tackle exclusion and deprivation and mainstream 
community cohesion.  
 
 
Faith and religion are not mentioned, however tackling racism runs through all 
policies.  There is a wider understanding of what makes a community function 
effectively. 
 
The 2007 study by Greene, Broome et al, questioned the participants involved 
with community cohesion programmes across Luton.  The response to an 
awareness around the subject featured over 70% having an understanding whilst 
over 85% identified that building community cohesions was either important or a 
very important part of their organisations work.
53
   
 
Of note, however, is the finding that many felt it was far too focussed on the 
Asian community.  In summary the report stated that local residents believed that 
the white working class were disadvantaged by the emphasis and preoccupation 
with other ethnic and faith groups. Despite Luton Borough Council’s broad 
definition of community cohesion a significant number of respondents including 
employees from Luton Borough Council, believed that community cohesion was 
still too concerned with the Islamic community and preventing extremist 
activities. One respondent from a voluntary organisation observed, “Community 
cohesion is predominantly about south Asians, you will hear that a lot but people 
will only tell you about that in a bar.” 54 
Community cohesion issues surrounding the Prevent Strategy have driven through 
funding streams and subsequent project work towards that focus.  In effect we see 
consecutive strategies with similar objectives, but where the 2002 National 
Community Cohesion Plan looked across all sections of society; the Prevent 
strategy was specifically aimed towards Muslim communities.  
Although necessary to address the urgent issues of Islamist extremism, it now 
seems counter intuitive to the whole ethos of the cohesion strategy.   
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One of the key criticisms of the Prevent funding was that alienation was created  
by focusing on one community and providing sections of that community with 
counter terrorism funding.  One Muslim group questioning why they were not 
receiving funds when others were.  Subsequent allegations that some of the 
Prevent funding had been used to promote extremism, was of course later picked 
up in the national media.  This was also mentioned in the Rowntree Foundation 
study where the research team conducting the study,  
..found concerns among policy makers and practitioners about the 
linking of ‘cohesion and ‘counter-terrorism’ agendas – in particular, 
that this risks stigmatising and alienating Muslim communities; and 
detracts from funding initiatives that might not fit in within a counter-
terrorism agenda, but which would build local cohesion (for instance 
bringing people together around shared local concerns.
55
    
 
With reference to far right political groups (particularly the British National 
Party), extremist political groups from across the political spectrum were 
identified as a major barrier to community cohesion by a number of respondents 
in the Luton survey. That has, of course, developed further and although not 
associated to the British National Party the rise of the English Defence League as 
a right wing organisation in Luton, has had an equally strong effect on the 
relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim.  
 
The Greene, Broome et al study, showed that the police in Luton were positively 
identified by a number of organisations who considered them significant partners, 
working together to forge community cohesion programmes.  The police 
organisation allows them to operate through regional teams with the aim of 
engaging with citizens and organisations through substantial partnership working.  
 
A community cohesion team exists and works closely with Prevent engagement 
officers who have established processes that allow for the delivery and reporting 
on community cohesion. There is regular consultation with a large network of 
local community contacts.  Hate crime reporting is monitored and officers support 
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multi-cultural events and feed back community tensions.
56
 Community cohesion 
officers operate in both Bedford and Luton and have done so for many years. 
Their focus remains broad.  
Prevent is not considered as any more important than other aspects of the total 
cohesion programme.  Particularly now with much of the original Prevent funding 
being withdrawn, there is a clear and obvious reigning in of Prevent programmes 
and it now sits more aligned with the other policies rather than appearing to 
predominate.  
 
Prevent still sits as an important subject especially when seen as a driver for 
interventions and safeguarding, but it appears to have ‘relaxed’.  It is as though as 
in Innes et al comments the same as for other areas in the United Kingdom, 
‘Levels of community cohesion within the Muslim Community have subsequently 
recovered, intimating that Prevent is not having a uniformly negative impact upon 
community attitudes and perceptions.’57 That clearly depends on who is consulted 
as the levels of mistrust of Prevent remain, but there appears to be a more positive 
dialogue existing which concerns itself with the safeguarding of vulnerable 
individuals. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE PREVENT STRATEGY 
 
 
4.1  Prevent as a national strategy Criticisms and benefits.  
 
There are five main drivers to the strategy and two supporting factors, as outlined 
in the Governments Prevent 2009 Document and discussed during the Welcome 
to PREVENT ‘09 conference in 2009.58 They are, to challenge the ideology 
behind violent extremism and support mainstream voices; disrupt those who 
promote violent extremism and support the places where they operate; support 
individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment or who have already been recruited 
by violent extremists.  It maintains delivery to, ‘increase the resilience of 
communities to violent extremism; address the grievances which ideologues are 
exploiting, to develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information; and 
improve strategic communications.’ 
 
The strategy made clear recommendations that partnership work was paramount 
and that it was not a police only strategy, but rather an inclusive community safety 
one.  The Association of Chief Police Officers stated that the main themes of 
Prevent are to: 
Mainstream Prevent into day-to-day policing, through neighbourhood 
policing, community engagement and related activity; to work in 
partnership to support individuals and institutions; ensure a joined-up 
approach to all police counter-terrorism activity; to develop Prevent 
capability at local, regional and national level.
59
 
The drive from the Association of Police Chiefs (ACPO) was to ensure that 
Prevent was mainstreamed in to what is termed, ‘community policing’.  There 
were specific teams, such as the ACPO Delivery Unit Teams; including the 
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National Community Tension Team and some police force areas separated the 
delivery away from counter terrorism units, whilst others did not.   
In many force areas there was and remains a cross over between the two.  Prevent 
was designed to be delivered by front line community officers, working within the 
Muslim communities. In this way Prevent would become established within the 
wider community safety portfolio – delivered and supported by those officers who 
already had working relationships with the community, thereby building on the 
trust that may have already existed.  Unfortunately, this has not been the case and 
many perceive Prevent to have failed. 
The Muslim communities which are at the heart of Prevent interventions are 
complex, with often opposing sentiments.  There have been suggestions that the 
extremists amidst those local communities could not operate without what is 
termed an open support for violent Jihad.  Mascini advises that there are other 
academics that emphasise the importance of sympathisers for Jihad.
60
 Support may 
be in the form of the immediate peer group or as we have seen through web based 
networks. 
 
The four Luton men who pleaded guilty of terrorism at Southwark crown court on 
1
st
 March, were known to their community and one was said to have been extreme 
even for the extremist and yet, as reported in ‘The Telegraph’, the community did 
not give him up to the authorities.
61
 Majority feeling may empathise with the 
political rationale behind the rhetoric, but rarely will members from any 
community agree with criminal acts in order to promote political or religious 
ideology. However the strength in influencing particularly young minds which are 
seeking identity and purpose can be enormous.  Post tells us that, ‘Terrorism is not 
a consequence of individual psychological abnormality. Rather it is a consequence 
of group or organisational pathology that provides a sense-making explanation to 
the youth drawn to these groups.
62
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We have seen though, that impact of a few can be enormously detrimental to the 
majority and it is incumbent on the majority to ensure that they self-regulate their 
communities where possible.  Because one person can hold strong political or 
ideological beliefs may be a cause for concern within a community. This is 
especially so when one considers that as Esposito writes on the ‘…distinctive 
differences of interpretation’ of the ‘Ideological Worldview of Revivalism.’ 63  the 
framework that Esposito sets out are extremely important in attempting to 
understand the rhetoric behind some of the views of some Muslims in stating the 
justification for their actions and activities and should be the basis of any reading 
into what the general framework is as well as the framework used by the more’ 
radical activists’ 
 
Gaffney in a preparation lecture concerning the psychology of terrorism states 
that, ‘.ideology, however ill-defined or misguided, provides the individual with 
their moral and political compass that inspires their actions, informs the way they 
interpret the world, and defines how they judge the actions of others.’64 It is 
absolutely vital therefore, that an early intervention is made to moderate the 
ideology and reduce the risk of it becoming unlawful.  The importance of the 
community standing strong in the face of violent jihadist extremist views is of 
course one of the key drivers of Prevent, empowering those very same 
communities to stand firm against radicalising elements.  This assumes that the 
communities are at one with each other, joined and strong, but that is not a regular 
feature of any community dynamic.  Particularly with, as previously stated when 
Muslim communities are so diverse in their cultural, political, geographical and 
historical contexts.  This is a difficulty that is perhaps promulgated, by the fact 
that Muslim community members often find themselves at variance with some 
aspects of modern western secular culture.  They may be as Leiken, suggests 
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totally independent, exceptionally retentive of their ways, producing a variant of 
‘globalised Islam’.65 
 
Muslim leadership in the United Kingdom has shown its determination to distance 
itself from outspoken extreme clerics such as Abu Hamza al-Masri and Abu 
Qatada al- Filistini, but the immense damage done to the majority of Muslim 
communities because of this rhetoric is certainly felt. A failure by the authorities, 
to intervene properly, because of a lack of appropriate legislation, damaged trust 
within Muslim communities and within the wider community in which they sit.  
Bungawala
66
 commenting on the former Labour Government, states that their 
liberalist policies allowed political refuge and freedom of speech.  Where these 
occurred, extreme clerics spread their propaganda and this is one of the factors 
that have caused Muslims in the United Kingdom to lose trust in the Prevent 
strategy.   
 
In 2007 The United Kingdom Government published a document called, 
‘Preventing violent extremism: winning hearts and minds.’67 This was created in 
response to the London bombings of July 2005, when it became painfully clear 
that the terror threat to the United Kingdom was not from international terrorists. 
Essentially local men raised and schooled within English communities had shown 
that they were susceptible to radical extremist views and had been radicalised both 
within the United Kingdom and further on visits to foreign countries.  
 
To prevent such radicalisation called for rapid interventions within the Muslim 
community. Hewitt,
68
 comments that Prevent builds on community cohesion work 
in order to establish coherent and resilient communities that are able to withstand 
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such extremism.  However Khan
69
 in his criticism of the strategy calls for 
community cohesion issues to be reviewed and not linked via a counter terrorism 
narrative.  It seems though, that as long radicalisation and violent extremism 
retains its focus with Islam, counter terrorism will maintain its focus on Muslim 
communities.   
The 2010 Muslim Council of Scotland report stated that it is inappropriate to link 
the Prevent strategy with tackling terrorism, arguing as others have, that cohesion 
is surely about wider community cohesion issues.  Its concentration on the Muslim 
community created a perception that it was a ‘problem community’ creating 
cohesion issues and divisions. This argument is supported by Kundani
70
 and 
Milne
71
 who state that established community cohesion links may be jeopardised 
by funding which can be an extremely divisive element as various groups vie for 
resources. Not only does it create division within the Muslim community, it 
creates resentment from those who are in the wider community and who receive 
no funding at all, for their projects and enhancement of social standards. In a 
report published by the Institute of Race Relations in 2009 and cited in 
Kundnani’s, paper, it was stated, ‘that Prevent has created the presentation of the 
Muslim community as a suspect one, fostering social divisions, encouraging 
tokenism; discourages local democracy and has done little to reduce the risk of 
violent radical extremism.’72 We have to remember that the Prevent strategy did 
not target Islam, it targeted the vulnerabilities exposed within Muslim 
communities and it targeted those extremists who usurped Islam for their own 
ideological purposes.  
 
The wording around much within the Prevent strategy and the pathfinder 
funding
73
is considered derogatory. However, if an open and honest debate is to be 
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considered the etymology may cause concern.  The Department for Communities 
and Local Government stated that Pathfinder funding would assist in, ‘Preventing 
violent extremism and...Creating a situation where Muslim communities reject and 
actively condemn violent extremism and seek to undermine and isolate violent 
extremists.’74That is appropriate and reasonable but sections of the strategy go on 
to state, ‘The key measure of success will be demonstrable changes in attitudes 
among Muslims, and wider communities they are part of, locally and nationally’.  
 
This will be done by ‘Understanding and mapping current local attitudes will thus 
be important and local partners will be invited to take part in developing, piloting 
and rolling out surveys that provide baselines for future progress.’ It created some 
clarity around what we, as a nation, were attempting to challenge.  The Muslim 
Peer - Baroness Warsi, perhaps spoke for the majority of Muslim community 
members in the United Kingdom when she as a Muslim stated, ‘we must accept 
that we’re all in this together, but Muslims have an added responsibility to defeat 
extremism, because extremism is claimed in the name of Islam.’75  
 
That honest statement has allowed for a clear and open dialogue and places huge 
responsibility on Muslim community leaders to look inwards and address issues 
that they some may have previously denied existed. This point was also made by 
one of the most senior Muslim police officers. Assistant Commissioner Tariq 
Ghaffur, had criticised the National Association of Muslim Police and the Muslim 
community as a whole for failing to face up to the realities of real and stark 
problems within certain sections of the wider Muslim community in the United 
Kingdom.  
76
 The Muslim Police Association as an advisory voice had quite rightly 
commented on the dangers they felt the strategy was likely to create.  They had 
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warned that, ‘It was triggering an upsurge in Islamophobia and deepening divisions 
in communities.’  Clearly it is not sufficient for matters relating to the safety of any 
community to be denied or ignored for the fear of causing controversy.  Extremist 
Islamist rhetoric is controversial and the methods to prevent it have also proved to 
be so.
77
 
Although Kundnani’s report ‘Spooked’ has been questioned in terms of whether its 
research is too heavily dependent on existing policy and academic reports, it is also 
held as useful by Githens-Mazer and Lambert.
78
  They highlight that Kundnani’s 
report shows how Prevent has in fact changed its emphasis from community 
engagement and cohesion support to one of thought policing and control.  In the 
reports key findings, Kundnani writes, ‘The current emphasis of Prevent on de-
politicising young people and restricting dissent is actually counterproductive 
because it strengthens the hands of those who say democracy is pointless.’ 
 
Maude makes a valid point reporting on the majority feeling of Muslim community 
that they feel the counter terror agenda is so strong that some Muslims feels that 
they are being spied on. Indeed in Lord Carlisle’s review of the Prevent strategy 
prior to the implementation of Prevent 2 he makes the statement that: 
 
Although Prevent has included some quite broad and occasionally 
unfocused community cohesion activities in the past, generally it has 
been productive.  It is realistic to accept that some problems have 
arisen, notably from the feeling of some parts of the community that 
they have been victims of state ‘snooping’. 79 
 
The fear that the strategy was an intelligence gathering process aimed solely at the 
Muslim communities proposed by Maude is confirmed by Zaman.  Who states, 
‘that the Prevent programme has been used to establish one of the most elaborate 
systems of surveillance ever seen.’ Zaman80 argued that the Prevent Strategy was 
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baseless and criminalised activities and attitudes that were legitimate and which 
were within the law. He stated that there is unequivocal condemnation from the 
Muslim community, political and religious leaders from most sections of Muslim 
society.  
There is confirmation that partner agencies as quite rightly the Muslim 
community has at times, felt that the supportive mechanisms within Prevent, such 
as empowering local communities to be resilient to radical extremist views and 
influences are somewhat blurred in the police need to naturally gather 
intelligence. That blurring of roles has also been felt and commented on by those 
responsible for the delivery. The only way to approach this controversial point is 
to be honest and state that there may be a commonality within the officer’s roles. 
To deny it merely adds to suspicion when the facts are plain to see. 
There are clearly defined roles in the police service, where Pursue and Prevent are 
not and never have been considered by the same officers, but there are also 
examples where this is not the case. Dodd
81
 in October 2009 wrote an article for 
the Guardian Newspaper. Its headline, ‘Government anti-terrorism strategy 'spies' 
on innocent,’ caused considerable anguish amongst local Muslim communities and 
also anecdotally amongst public sector professionals who felt that they were 
intelligence gathering. One example cited in the article was that of the programme 
manager for Prevent in Birmingham – Paul Marriot being a senior counter- 
terrorism police officer seconded to work in the council equalities division.  
 
Shami Chakrabarti who was the head of the group Liberty is reported as stating, ‘It 
is the biggest domestic spying programme, targeting the thoughts and beliefs of the 
innocent in Britain in modern times.’ 82  Dodd went on to print the Home Office 
response as, "Any suggestion that Prevent is about spying is simply wrong. Prevent 
is about working with communities to protect vulnerable individuals and address 
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the root causes of radicalisation."
83
 Much of the Muslim community was far from 
convinced.  This has been echoed locally where one respondent has stated that they 
are convinced that prevent is an intelligence gathering tool.  That particular person 
is neither a Muslim or from the Muslim community but has been engaged in 
Prevent. 
Kundnani has argued that Prevent has been the very antithesis of protecting 
vulnerable Muslim communities from violent extremism, stating that it has created 
an atmosphere of mistrust and contempt.  He writes ‘Prevent-funded voluntary 
sector organisations and workers in local authorities are becoming increasingly 
wary of the expectations on them to provide the police with information on young 
Muslims and their religious and political opinions.’84  Local authorities and partner 
agencies have a duty to protect the vulnerable and they have to act appropriately if 
they receive a complaint about extreme behaviour in their environments. Whether 
that complaint reaches the police would normally depend on relationships between 
the organisations and the level of perceived criminality of the act. Clearly it would 
be entirely appropriate for reporting to exist on a person who states he wants to kill 
others for whatever reason that person has. Conversely, because an individual 
expresses a political view does not make them an intelligence target. That is a 
factor that has created fear and mistrust.  
The strategy was designed for the right reasons and that was to protect the 
vulnerable members of the Muslim community from radicalisation. However, the 
wording of the strategy did little more than perhaps confirm many of the fears 
contained within Dodd’s revelations. 
The key elements within the strategy sometimes referred to as the ‘five plus two’ 
(post - Chapter 4) are supportive and created to empower local Muslim 
communities. They also provided doubts and suspicion in that they contained the 
sentence, ‘Develop supporting intelligence, analysis and information.’   It is this 
blurring of function and delivery that has caused the strategy to be perceived in 
such a negative way by many within the Muslim community. The local authority 
and partner agencies endeavoured to understand the ‘make-up’ of the local 
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Muslim community, but in doing so placed them under a spotlight.  Although 
Government guidance was created within consultation with many eminent 
Muslim academics and bodies, the end users of such guidance were to a large 
degree, unaware of some of the sensitivities that needed to be appreciated prior to 
formal engagement.    
It is unlikely that the majority of the British public has an understanding of Islam 
and Muslim culture and they may, therefore, perceive certain elements of it as a 
threat.  Whilst other religions may be seen to be diminishing, Islam is the fastest 
growing religion in the United Kingdom and Europe.
85
  Muslim communities are 
still a minority ethnic group at approximately three per cent of the overall 
population based on the 2001 census
86
 and that creates additional vulnerabilities 
of tolerance and understanding. There are however pockets of community where 
the representation of Muslims far exceeds the national average.  Luton is certainly 
representative of this demographic anomaly with a Muslim population exceed in 
12%.   
The United Kingdom is largely considered to have a secular society, which is a 
societal change over two generations at most.  It may be unfair to state, but a large 
number of the British public may not understand much of their stated religion 
(Church of England). Even though 72 per cent have recorded it as so in the 2001 
census.
87
 They are even less likely to understand the complexities and 
requirements of another one.  
Where the Islamic religion places such considerable emphasis on cultural 
experiences and day to day living, an issue of comprehension by non-Muslims 
may become apparent. Clearly there was and remains a need to understand all 
cultures within our society and more particularly perhaps the Muslim one.  This is 
where Islamic awareness training through Prevent has proffered upon many 
partner agencies an appreciation and understanding of the differences between 
what is normal political and religious discussion and what is worrying rhetoric.  It 
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has also allowed for a more intellectual debate between parties who may wish to 
take a more fundamental view as opposed to those who favour a ‘mainstream’ 
argument.  Understanding what those views mean is difficult and reporting all 
such rhetoric was encouraged with police leading on interpretation and 
assessment. 
Engagement with Muslim men and women who express what may be perceived as 
extreme views is important.  It is inappropriate and dangerous to merely condemn 
or suppress views that seem dangerous. Hundal
88
 advised that those people 
supporting the Prevent policy and strategy had recommended that dialogue range 
had to be greater and also had to include those whose views it was opposed to, in 
order to actively reach the radicals through the very people that those radical 
thinkers were themselves engaging with. In 2009, Lord Ahmed of Wimbledon 
condoned this course of action.
89
  
As an outspoken and active member of the British Muslim community, he agreed 
with a stronger stance suggested by senior police officers in establishing dialogue 
between radical individuals as they were the very people that younger more 
vulnerable Muslim men were likely to have credibility with. 
 
In 2006 Bright
90
 had warned that the Prevent strategy would be erroneous, 
empowering those who were politicised within the Muslim community and 
neglecting to address the needs of the majority ‘moderate’ members.  From the 
‘Pathfinder’ funding onwards, there has been resentment that huge amounts of 
money have been provided through the Prevent strategy at both national and local 
funding level.  The subsequent appropriate use of this money has been critically 
divisive.  Gardham
91
 reported that some of the Prevent money was being directed 
towards the very people that were likely to be responsible for radicalisation of the 
Muslim youth.  
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The converse argument however is one that Kundnani makes, in suggesting that it 
is the groups that support the government that are rewarded and that criticise the 
government is to, ‘risk losing funding and facing isolation as an ‘ extremist’ 
organisation. Schwartz and Alk-Alawi
92
 have commented that the Prevent funding 
streams had placed £1.5 million at the disposal of the Muslim council of Britain 
and £80,000 to a British branch of the Muslim brotherhood and other extremist 
organisations.  
 
Prevent funding provided considerable sums of money to a variety of Muslim 
groups and local authorities to enhance and improve Muslim communities in the 
United Kingdom, but that in itself may appear to undermine the overall effort 
relating to community cohesion as one respondent in survey by Greene et al 
stated, ‘Community cohesion is predominantly about South Asians, you will hear 
that a lot but people will only tell you about that in a bar and will not say it 
publicly. A lot feel it is about promoting Islam, definitely fosters more 
resentment.’93 
 
Prevent is not a police strategy.  It is a national Government strategy designed for 
delivery across all public sectors in an effort to combat the very real risk of a 
continual rise in Islamist extremism; itself based upon Al Qaeda inspired rhetoric. 
Therefore, local authority and more recently, education and health, have a role to 
play and find themselves with Prevent strategies at the heart of some of their 
organisational strategy documents.  Unfortunately, the Police service of the 
United Kingdom, because of its clear primacy with the Pursue, Protect and 
Prepare elements of CONTEST, naturally took the lead with Prevent.  Had the 
strategy implementation been delivered by local authorities and separated from 
the counter terrorism agenda of the Police service it may well have received more 
acceptances from the Muslim community that it was aimed at protecting. That is 
not a criticism on the police, but an obvious observation based upon responses 
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from the Muslim community and many Prevent delivery staff and officers with 
whom the author has spoken.  
 
There does seem to be considerable criticism of Prevent.  However if one 
examines the extent of local Prevent delivery and its subsequent Muslim 
community engagement, there is an extremely strong argument in its favour. .  The 
Prevent strategy for all of its criticisms has focussed local authority and partner 
agencies to consider the local Muslim communities at much greater depth. It has, 
through the implementation of national indicators such as NI 35,
94
 focused 
strategy and spending streams towards greater Muslim awareness and cohesion.   
But even with this check and measure criticism from local analysis has resulted in 
a respondent stating, 
 
In order to meet the needs of the original strategy and the NI35 
requirement and their complexities in respect of outcomes an 
operational framework was developed to help us understand key aims 
and values that we could share with local communities. The difficulty 
was that at Home Office level; the messages were different to those 
being spoken at a local level which led to a miss-trust with delivering 
organisations.
95
 
 
All community based strategies aim at short term delivery for the betterment of the 
community long term and Prevent is no different.  It is complicated and relies on 
involvement by many to achieve its aims.
96
  The 2005 Luton community plan,
97
 
states that, ‘Luton has achieved a great deal in recent years. However, much 
remains to be done.’ United Kingdom police forces and their local authority 
partners have worked with the delivery of the Prevent strategy since its inception 
in 2007. It has had measurable success in channelling resources towards project 
based Muslim community cohesion programmes and has been instrumental in 
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delivering a raft of Muslim awareness courses and literature across the public 
sector. Yet it remains for some a mistrusted and misguided strategy which creates 
division and which has prevented dialogue rather than created the opportunities 
from it.  As Bungawala
98
 has stated in his analysis of the Prevent strategy, what 
the Government considers enhancement and positivity has, in fact, brought the 
relationship between Muslims and the government to its lowest.  
 
Zaman, in the damming series of Guardian newspaper headlines and articles takes 
this a stage lower, controversially and perhaps dogmatically stating, ‘The rules 
now appear to be: if you are a Muslim, accept that you are a terror suspect, accept 
infringement of your liberties, accept being treated differently.’99   
The entire strategy was recommended for review in 2009 and as such the 2011 
revised strategy, which the Home Office
100
 state concentrates on addressing all 
forms of terrorism, not on one community.  It clarifies that Prevent work must 
target terrorism that is the greatest threat to the national security of the United 
Kingdom. This is a comprehensive and important change in language and 
methodology and one which rightly has considered that the original strategy has 
been damaging to Muslim communities. Innes et al, make the comment in the 
most recent and comprehensive review of the effects of prevent nationally that, 
‘there is a better understanding of the make‐up of communities, and evidence of a 
better comprehension of where key risks and threats are located.’ 101 A change in 
terminology to ‘Safeguarding’ has allowed for a more intuitive approach which is 
inclusive and more meaningful in the terms of partner agency working.  There is a 
growing willingness to engage with local police and local authority in the delivery 
of a strategy that will allow for community resilience and empowerment against 
extremist groups.  
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There are within this chapter many criticisms of prevent from a national 
perspective.  It is possible and necessary within the dissertation, to consider the 
positive aspects of the strategy.  As a direct result of training, funding and policy, 
Prevent has allowed personal access to and a better understanding of the cultural, 
political and religious differences within local Muslim communities.    
 
There are changes within the Prevent 2 strategy which recognise the demands of 
social and political commentators and more importantly the Muslim communities 
who have criticised the original strategy delivery. Doubts about its purpose have 
been raised from professional bodies and the Muslim community.   
 
In 2010 the Government stated that Prevent needed to be reviewed and the 
Guardian Newspaper has long been one of its chief critics, stating it is nothing 
more than a government agenda allowing for information gathering on Muslim 
communities hidden behind the spin of community safety and cohesion strategy 
and policy.  Apart from some referral programmes and anecdotal evidence it is 
difficult to assess what success prevent has had in stopping further radicalisation 
and possible involvement in what has become termed ‘violent jihad’. There is 
clearly no algorithm for what has not yet happened.    There are many Muslim 
academics that have assisted with the Prevent strategy, but the often heard 
argument is that these people are not representatives of Muslim society as a 
whole.  But then who is?  Local Mosque committees, councillors, Imams all may 
represent certain groups, but they may also only represent voices at either end of a 
political spectrum. 
 
As well as critics, ‘there are many who see that the strategy aims to build on good 
work that already existed to make cohesive and strong communities’102. It was not 
designed to replace community cohesion, which had been developed diverse and 
inclusive of all creeds, races and nationalities. It is fair to state that within Bedford 
and Luton with the constant friction between some Muslim groups and an 
emerging English Defence League the concentration was certainly within the 
Muslim community.   
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The Prevent strategy does explain that other communities affected by violent 
extremist groups would also fall under the protection of Prevent. However, the 
criticality for public protection created considerable activity within Muslim 
communities with publicised high profile terrorist suspect arrests. The strategy, 
highlights that partnership-working, will support communities and institutions, to 
challenge and reject the message of extremism and to support individuals in 
diverting them away from violent extremism.   It is therefore with considerable 
interest that the arrest of  Zahid Iiqbal, Mohamed Sharfaraz Ahmed, Umar Arshad 
and Syed Frahan Hussain for facilitating, planning and encouraging acts of 
terrorism, and their guilty pleas in March 2013, have not caused more 
consternation.  Whilst appropriate monitoring of community tension, following 
this event has been conducted, there is no apparent concern.  The community 
represented by a local mosque representative stated that these men do not 
represent the views of the wider Muslim community and that community cohesion 
policy was working well in Luton. 
 
This last strand was and still remains the function of ‘Channel’, where anyone 
who is caught up in the radicalisation process are provided with alternative views 
and religious teaching which provides them with answers to their questions which 
are informed and ‘mainstream’.103   
 
When a community is divided in fear and subject to damaged race relations, 
actions by those delivering cohesion strategy and policy will become influenced 
by other agendas.  It is also difficult to separate Muslim communities , community 
cohesion, community grievances and racial tensions from each other when the 
only community that seems to be receiving any widespread interests,  is a Muslim 
community linked by associations or media speculation to negative imagery and 
terrorism. 
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There is a large amount of criticism that community cohesion programmes within 
Muslim communities should not be promulgated through what, is in effect, a 
counter terrorist narrative.
104
 Yet so much of Prevent did exactly that. Prevent 
funding provided local authorities with an ability to create projects for immediate 
engagement with Muslim communities, but it was directly associated with Prevent 
which in turn remained under the control of the Police and regional government.   
 
There was a continual police input with several cohesion officers being engaged 
and employed through Prevent funding.  Engagement with the community 
occasionally proposed for example methods of reducing Muslim community fears. 
Police lead initiatives such as “Operation Nicole” and “Archer”, “Victoria” and 
“Watch Over Me” were delivered locally. These are table-top exercises designed 
to engage with Muslim communities and ‘encourage two-way debate about 
counter terrorism operations and to help police and partners understand the impact 
of these operations on community cohesion in areas.’105  
 
These are useful exercises in trying to explain police methods and processes, 
especially around counter terrorism operations and the community impact that 
such events create.  They serve a useful function, but with the exception of 
“Watch Over Me”106 they certainly concentrate on a counter terrorism agenda. It 
appears extremely difficult to separate Prevent from that counter terrorism 
narrative.  In fact, the question has to be asked, ‘why does it need to be 
separated?’  It is there for a specific purpose and that is to prevent violent 
extremism – regardless of which community that presents an issue for.  That work 
may give the perception of negative issues existing, but on the positive side the 
examples cited in national good work also include excellent examples of 
engagement through the Prevent agenda. Examples include Muslim women 
groups being formed to advise and support their specific and important role within 
their communities.  
107
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There are other examples however of a more positive approach by prevent 
engagement that moved towards creating safer environments for Muslims.  
Exercise ‘VICTORIA’ encourages partnerships to, ‘develop a shared 
understanding of the threat communities’ face from all forms of violent 
extremism.’ Engagement within schools to prevent bullying through ‘Act Now’ 
and ‘Watch Over Me’, produced a wealth of material for use in PSHE curriculum 
that did not just concentrate of radical extremism, but addressed all forms of 
coercion and bullying.   
 
Cleveland Police ran conferences designed to allow young people to explore 
politics and religion by examining terrorism and extremism in a safe, controlled 
and informed environment, where the views of the young people attending were 
seen to have changed and where they were also shown to have realised that they 
had empowerment and could affect positively their own communities in a way 
they had not previously considered.   
 
Both Bedford and Luton have seen considerable advance in the engagement with 
Muslim women’s groups allowing for cultural understanding and much closer 
engagement with multi-faith groups, Mosque committees and learning and 
cultural establishments. 
 
4.2 The 2011 Prevent Strategy 
Prevent 2 was hailed by the Government as a new crack down on terror, and an 
‘end to ‘passive tolerance’ of extremist Islamic organisations who foster hatred 
for the West and radicalise young Muslims. The Forward to the Prevent White 
Paper presented to Parliament in 2011 perhaps, as could be expected, begins by 
outlining the failing of the last government in its delivery.  
The old strategy was flawed in that it confused the delivery of 
Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to 
prevent terrorism. It failed to confront the extremist ideology at the 
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heart of the threat we face; and in trying to reach those at the heart of 
radicalisation, funding sometimes even reached the very extremist 
organisations that Prevent should have been confronting.’ 108 
The revised Prevent strategy takes into account the commentary from academics 
and community members, as well as those responsible for the delivery of the 
strategy through a variety of programmes and spending streams.  The criticism 
that appears fundamental to their argument for change, is that the last strategy 
failed to separate the integration policy from the counter terrorism agenda. As 
stated though, that is a difficult divide to create.  
The changes to the new Prevent programme appear to address the grievances 
outlined by all previous studies and commentary and in particular, the former 
acceptance of provision of a platform for extremist rhetoric which opposes the 
United Kingdom ‘values of human rights, equality before the law, democracy and 
full participation in our society.’109 Prime Minister David Cameron made it quite 
clear in his Munich speech, that The Government would oppose the ideology of 
extremism and terrorism, refusing to work with organisations that promulgated 
those ideologies.  
The Government also made it quite clear that they maintained a divide between 
such views and legitimate religious belief.  They have also stated that funding 
would not be provided to any group which failed to accept the United Kingdom’s 
fundamental policies and values.  This is a change that will be acceptable to many 
outside of the Muslim community and to some within it who see Muslim 
conservatism as damaging to the Muslim community as a whole.   
It is difficult from this study to ascertain what real impact such a hard line 
approach will have, but the Government cannot be accused of failing to clarify 
their position.  Funding has been drastically reduced in line with many other 
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austerity cuts and although Prevent 2 states that it will not support any group that 
does not agree with its democratic and lawful policies, it maintains full support for 
a wider community cohesion and the protection of all persons who could be 
influenced or targeted by extremism whether from religious or political motives.  
Community based decisions will always influence communities but should never 
be allowed to undermine basic tenants of existing legislation.  As in many 
communities covering many religions, local decisions based upon cultural norms 
are regularly imposed.  One of the key findings of the report by Innes et al when 
establishing localised resolution within Muslim communities was, ‘from a man  
who was a self-defined moderate Muslim stated that they would look to the 
family, then the community then the Imam to resolve an extremism problem.’ 110   
 
There has been criticism that under Prevent 1. Some minority voices within 
Muslim communities had been allowed too great a voice, demanding changes 
which were unrepresentative of the Muslim community as a whole.   As the 
Guardian reported, ‘To safeguard our rights there must be one law for all and no 
religious courts.’ 111   
 
 
4.3 An Examination of the Local implementation and its impact on  
            Bedfordshire communities 
 
Practitioners in the posts of community engagement officers and local authority 
Prevent partner agencies have all worked towards the implementation of the 
strategy across Bedfordshire.  They follow national guidance and best practice.  
There are projects for the delivery of Islamic awareness, community engagement 
support group and community events.  Luton borough council and its partners are 
acutely aware of the difficulties that the town face.  It has had no choice but to 
stand strong on its policy implementation and an enormous amount of positive 
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work carried out by cohesion and Prevent managers in Bedford and Luton along 
with their partner agency officers and staff, enthusiastically drive the council 
strategies forward.  The council strategic aims are: 
 
               To develop a detailed, sophisticated and measured understanding   
               of the local drivers of extremism; to establish a clear position on   
               how extremism is being and should be tackled in Luton and; to  
               identify practical steps and clear delivery mechanisms, which  
               ensure measures are in place to tackle extremism in all its forms.  
               These may include existing interventions such as Prevent, Luton in  
               Harmony.
112
  
 
Further to this its objectives are clearly set and state that the Extremism Working 
Party objectives are, ‘To take the findings of the Luton Commission on 
Community Cohesion ……..to: consider and commission locally relevant 
research; take evidence from external extremism’  
 
This is particularly useful as far as this dissertation research is concerned, because 
it clearly sits within the scope of being able to provide primary empirical research 
in advance of any future commissioned assessment.  It has been stated within the 
empirical research that the original strategy guidelines although comprehensive, 
required substantial work to be carried out, in order to identify the needs of the 
local Muslim community, specifically in relation to the Prevent agenda.   
 
Local authority partners were, “convinced and signed up” to delivering this within 
the community cohesion agenda.  However the suspicion from the Muslim 
community was such that the Muslim community became, “increasingly difficult 
to engage with.”  113 
 
There is now a clear statement of purpose which specifically relates to Prevent 
and more importantly for the community as a whole all matters that are 
considered extremist and potentially damaging to what a majority view considers 
to be mainstream attitude and behaviour which takes into account the views and 
wishes of the majority of members of those communities.  ‘Alongside its many 
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successes, there are areas which still suffer from high levels of multiple 
deprivations.  Factors such as social class, income, ethnic origin and disability 
create unacceptable inequalities between Lutonians in terms of opportunities and 
quality of life.’114   
 
As mentioned, Luton is seen as the birth place of the English Defence League and 
has also documented and published links with Islamist extremists who have 
perpetrated terror attacks. Media comments in both the Mail and Telegraph have 
stated that, ‘All roads in terror investigations seem to lead to Luton.’115 Such 
commentary has created an unsavoury image of a town overtaken with extremism 
and recent television documentaries (March 2012), may have compounded that 
view.   Recent admissions in Southwark Crown Court (March 1
st
 2013) - to the 
extent of terrorism activity by four Luton men will hardly diminish the negative 
association. But it is the way that the community impact and tensions are assessed 
and addressed that will make the difference between anxiety or retribution and 
maintenance of the status quo.  
 
Although ‘Prevent’ has a specific purpose in reducing the risk from extremism, 
community cohesion policy and strategy also makes a clear purpose in that 
specific direction, ‘The Government is clear that communities must be at the 
centre of the response to community conflict, extremism, deprivation and 
disadvantage.’116 Clearly there are extreme elements within Bedfordshire, but the 
majority of Muslim men and women seek to live their lives in peaceful harmony.  
 
As two of the originally recognised ‘Pathfinder’117 funded towns in the United 
Kingdom, Luton and Bedford have been the recipients of ‘Prevent’ engagement 
from the strategy’s implementation. However, it is not a strategy that is trusted or 
liked by all who have to work with or face the consequences of it.  Bedford has 
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now lost the Prevent funding where Luton has retained it.  However both towns 
continue to experience situations where the Prevent intervention is important and 
suitable.  
With the establishment of a community working party, which was set up to fill 
what was perceived to be a gap in the sharing of community issues, a forum exists 
to openly discuss fears, needs and expectations from the Muslim community 
members that attend as well as local authority partners.   Good dialogue existed 
before this group was formed, but it now has a more formal platform. 
The delivery teams are acutely aware of the sensitivities around Prevent 
references and have advised, that in general terms, “Prevent” as a term is not used 
in introduction or conversations with the Muslim community members.  
Safeguarding is acceptable and understood and seeks to achieve the same goals of 
protecting the community’s vulnerable members.  
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CHAPTER 5. QUESTIONNAIRE EVALUATIONS AND ANALYSIS  
 
5.1 Methodology 
 
It seems that community members who are already engaged strongly with partners 
in community cohesion and therefore, Prevent are the ones most likely to respond 
to the questionnaire.  Some members have and some have not.  The research for 
this paper has received responses from over eighty per cent of the Prevent 
engagement staff.  Therefore we may take the comments provided as 
representative for the purposes of future local developmental work. There was far 
less response from the Muslim community, which is not a reflection on it, but 
rather an indication of how difficult it is sometimes to reach.  Therefore it must be 
stated that although there are views expressed from Muslim community members 
they are not in enough number to be considered quantitive or qualitative, from a 
research perspective. This section summarises the answers to the questions 
highlighting the key themes under discussion. 
 
What can be seen from the current Prevent teams is that they are in many cases 
the same officers and staff who have been involved with community engagement 
and cohesion programmes and have inherited Prevent work streams.  They are 
clearly the most expert in commenting on the changes Prevent has brought about.  
Muslim community members who are engaging with Prevent quite rightly hold 
strong views of the strategy and have a very, ‘in depth’, understanding of its 
purpose and difficulties.  The assessments of the responses from all participants 
have been recorded here some as quotes and much as summaries.  The question 
sets are included with the explanatory notes and ethical requirement papers in an 
annexe post.  This section summarises the answers to the questions highlighting 
the key themes under discussion. 
 
Prevent delivery has necessarily relied on establishing what the community 
looked like and where there are potential threats to it. Whilst allowing for a, 
‘targeted and proportionate use of shared resources.’ It has and continues to create 
a feeling of concentration amongst the Muslim community which continues to the 
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feeling of being targeted as a “Problem” community – a label that is unwanted for 
obvious reasons. 
 
Local response to the wording has returned a poor verdict on the closeness of the 
counter terrorism strategy to the Muslim community.  The fact that “violent 
extremism,” seems so closely associated with Prevent and then by association the 
Muslim community has effectively labelled the Muslim community with 
derogative and negative terminology, which has angered  the Muslim collective 
and done little to prevent the Islamophobia seen to be so vehemently expressed 
within popular British media, 
 
 
5.2  Not Just a Local Issue 
 
A member of the Muslim community responded that in order to move forward we 
all needed to, “recognise that the UK’s foreign policy had fuelled violent 
extremism.”  The Governments words around “democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs 
rang hollow.”  This was so set against the issues that the foreign policy supported, 
concerning Iraq, Afghanistan and Palestine.  The world is clearly a smaller space 
when politics and religion is considered.  The impact is felt acutely by members 
of the Ummah and sometimes these issues are concentrators of anger suspicion 
and fear.  There were several responses that stated that the community did not 
believe the government.  Especially following the apparent cover up of the death 
of Dr Kelly and the weapons of mass-destruction  issues.  Local community 
feeling was that there were agendas behind Prevent that were not properly 
explained or discussed and therefore trust in Prevent itself was very limited. 
 
Muslim or not, many members of the public are suspicious of the police which is 
a barrier to effective engagement.  This has been reported acutely so amongst first 
and second generation Muslims. Whether Bangladeshi, Pakistani or Somali, their 
own life experiences often bring them into negative forms of engagement with the 
police in their birth countries as well as presently or perhaps when they were 
growing up.   
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The perceptions they may have, fuelled by negative media reporting will and has 
been reported as profoundly influencing their feelings of doubt and mistrust.  The 
police are seen as one collective, rather than individual self-autonomous 
organisations with local interest.  As such reporting on police activity in one area 
creates a perception on likely local delivery.  Unfortunately media reporting rarely 
relays positive aspects but frequently negative ones. 
 
 
5.3 Community Cohesion 
 
Prevent engagement officers employed through the local authority have the task 
of assisting in the delivery of community cohesion through events and work 
which promote the inter-faith community cohesion agenda.  This has been a 
multi-faith as well as Muslim inclusive agenda, whereas Prevent was and is seen 
to concentrate on Muslim community issues alone. The wider community 
cohesion programme is all important and the drive has been to build on previous 
partnerships and relationships established through that programme as well as 
encouraging new relationships. Therefore, community cohesion is still considered 
as the most important aspect in making the Luton and Bedford multi-faith groups 
come together and work as well as live in more harmony. That is a collective issue 
for local authority, partner agencies and most importantly the community 
members. 
 
Several respondents stated, “Defeating terrorism must be seen as a responsibility 
of all and not blaming one part (Muslim) of the community.  Everyone must see 
the benefits of a cohesive society and buy into that concept.” Some respondents 
from both delivery and community feel that Prevent has damaged community 
cohesion. However, there is a strong feeling locally that cohesion has not been 
damaged by Prevent.  The base line work that the local authority and the Muslim 
community were engaged in prior to prevent has continued successfully.   
 
There appears to have been some confusion around the delivery objectives of 
Prevent one.  Was it ‘wider community cohesion or focused involvement?’  One 
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of the reported positives is now that a far more structured approach has allowed 
funding to be focused in the area of personnel, who can focus on delivery of an 
agreed agenda.  This has allowed for better partnership working and an address of 
the Prevent agenda. Crucial to this is the safeguarding process and Channel 
Project
118
 which sits more comfortably with other partner agencies.  Channel has 
been examined as part of an Ofsted inspection in March 2012 and praised as good 
practice.  However, a member of the Muslim community has responded that 
Prevent 2 is worse than Prevent One, making matters worse and that they felt the 
Government did not seem to listen or appropriately communicate with groups 
such as the Muslim Council of Britain.  One respondent called Prevent, “a right 
wing initiative aimed at preventing legitimate dissent.”   
 
They went on to state that, “Prevent ignored the roots of radicalisation, failing to 
differentiate between violent extremism and alternative “un-British” viewpoint.”  
“That to hold views and beliefs in Sharia law being superior to democracy and in 
the Khilafah.’ They also felt that it would further marginalise the Muslim 
community and will do nothing to prevent violent extremism.   
 
The comment made by this community member that Prevent claims to support, 
“mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs” but then insists on 
adoption of western liberal values being a contradiction.  There was severe 
criticism of the Government use of organisations such as Quilliam, The Centre for 
Social Cohesion and other “highly divisive anti-extremist think tanks”. It was felt 
that these in the main should be ignored as unrepresentative of the Muslim 
community and yet the ones who had played such an important role in the 
development of the Prevent programme. Early Prevent criticism was that it was 
made up of presumptions about what motivated Muslim agenda’s.   
 
Comments from some Muslim community members highlighted that the original 
strategy relied heavily on certain Muslim academics and scholars who were 
unrepresentative of the Muslim community as a whole. The antithesis of this is of 
                                                 
118
 Channel uses existing collaboration between local authorities, the police, statutory partners 
(such as the education sector, social services, children’s and youth services and offender 
management services) and the local community to: identify individuals at risk of being drawn in to 
violent extremism; assess the nature and extent of that risk; develop the most appropriate support.. 
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course, that with the Muslim Diaspora creating such diverse communities under 
one religion, unified representation would be an almost impossible outcome.   
Likewise it was felt that some Muslim groups who condemned Prevent were 
putting themselves as representative of a wide group of individuals under 
“umbrella” organisations. In reality it was thought that Prevent actually impacted 
very few Muslims within the overall community and the only ones who made 
most vocal representation were the ones already politicised.   
 
Anecdotally, Prevent is not held up by Muslim community members as a 
praiseworthy concept but it is rather seen as ‘grudgingly accepted as needed.’ 
There is still an image problem, the original branding and close counter terrorist 
association continues to create a suspicion.  Several respondents commented that, 
‘Prevent is only one part of a much larger issue concerning Muslims and other 
ethnic groups and that is one of world inequality, poverty and alienation amongst 
some groups/ethnicities in the UK. Cohesion will not come from community 
engagement alone, but from a narrowing of inequalities.’   
 
 
5.4   The concept that prevent is a “Spying tool” for the Counter Terrorism   
        Agenda 
 
One theme is that Prevent has been and still remains an area within the CT 
Strategy and environment and that has caused some issues.  Prevent 2 makes a 
very clear point about it not spying on communities and yet where there is a need 
to establish vulnerabilities within the communities and produce any form of gap 
analysis it can easily be interpreted as spying. One respondent highlighted the fact 
that suspicion around Prevent can be measured in degrees by the person one 
questions about it. That response is always likely to arise from environmental as 
well as personal experiences and former interaction between members of the 
Muslim community and the police.   
 
There has been considerable anecdotal evidence of professional colleagues in 
probation, education and health who have felt unease about former referral 
processes. To some of them Prevent 1 seemed to be asking them to spy on behalf 
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of the police.  ‘Channel’ is well communicated and the Luton model has been set 
up for a community response via the “community channel panel”. This Panel is 
chaired by the Director of Children services and it is not a police lead process.  
Whilst there is a strong counter terrorism interest in the Prevent agenda it is felt 
by members of the Muslim community that the suspicion over motives will 
always remain.  Several engagement officers and staff felt that as long as the 
counter terrorism agenda held control of the Prevent strategy they would have 
difficulties in assuaging such fears and their role in creating a strong safe 
community through a cohesion programme would remain hampered by Prevent.  
 
 
5.5 Phraseology and Funding Issues Causing Concerns 
 
The wording of the old Prevent strategy has been seen as derogatory and divisive 
and to a degree patronising. The messages that Prevent delivered initially were 
confusing. The phraseology and branding statements such as “communities defeat 
terrorism”, which appeared on most of the posters and paperwork have been 
criticised as creating a problem in Luton.  It was felt that the “wider community” 
was pointing its finger at the Muslim community and saying, “You are the 
problem,” rather than a collective response or solution.   
 
One officer who has become involved with Prevent through the new strategy felt 
that they were required to work harder to explain the purposes of the whole 
strategy and regularly felt that they  had to remove old perceptions and suspicions 
before finding a common ground.  In essence Prevent 1 had created hurdles and 
barriers although that officer felt that the whole Prevent strategy from its inception 
had been positive and had always good intention. Interestingly that officer felt that 
if mistakes had been made they were mistakes that could and have been worked 
on.  There has been a substantial drive to resolve issues and make Prevent work. 
Taking note of critics of the Prevent delivery, officers have been able to see where 
previous mistakes were made.  It seems that Prevent 1 was what it was - a quickly 
implemented strategy, untried and untested in its day, but nevertheless a solution 
to a critical set of issues that required urgent attention. 
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In the early stages of Prevent 1, Pathfinder funding was allocated by assessing per 
capita head of Muslim members within a town or cities overall population. This 
was seen as arbitrary, with little or no analysis of whether there were any risks 
present at all in those towns.  It has been seen as an affront by the Muslim 
community that the government bodies involved have said there are lots of 
Muslims in that town. Therefore they must have the funding because there must 
be issues within the towns Muslim community. Funding has divided the Muslim 
community with finances being given to groups which may have opposing views, 
but the silent majority are not being represented. Funding has allowed a greater 
voice and engagement.   
 
This has been extremely damaging by labelling whole sections of a community as 
dangerous or at risk, when in fact it has little or no substance.  That legacy 
remains albeit funding has been reduced considerably overall.  Prevent funding 
has also been criticised as creating an industry.  The funding is available, 
therefore staff and officers need to be employed through the funding and National 
Indicators have to be met and satisfied to justify the expenditure. The funding for 
Prevent which developed into funding under Preventing Violent Extremism was 
seen as even more offensive terminology.  This funding which was aimed 
specifically towards Muslim communities made the assumption that the Muslim 
community’s issues were measured by how much of a problem it is perceived to 
have and that is reflected in the amount of funding provided. Towns such as Luton 
were allocated such funds creating resentment from those local communities that 
were in need of finances to increase their community cohesion, but who were 
disqualified because they were not Muslim groups. Unfair allocation was one 
complaint and both Luton and Bedford responders who stated that   their funding 
damaged the cohesion programme that was in place. This is a response that has 
been echoed in Choudhury and Fenwick’s 2011 report.119   
 
                                                 
119
 Choudhury T., Fenwick H. (2011), The impact of counter-terrorism measures on Muslim 
Communities. ECHR report 72.  Durham University.[online] Available at: 
http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/publications/our-research/research-reports/research-reports-
71-80/index.html  [Accessed December 2012]. p.85. 
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In Luton this funding has been called “Dirty” money because of its Prevent 
association.  It is seen as divisive within as well as without Muslim community 
groups.  
 
Funding money was vehemently criticised but a small group in Luton called 
Hizbut Tahreer
120
who openly said that anyone who accepted funding was aligning 
themselves with the Home Office and the Police.  A comment that should be 
taken seriously and is a worry was that some felt that the communities saw 
funding as payment and the ‘quid pro quo’ was information from the Muslim 
community about the Muslim community. National reporting through newspapers 
and high profile television documentaries has stained the town with an image of 
extremism and on-going terrorist associations.  Groups such as Hizbut Tahreer 
and formerly named Muslims Against Crusades may be vociferous in the ideology 
but they have also been reported as condemning terrorist atrocities.
121
 This is 
hardly a dynamic that creates a feeling that Prevent is not targeting closely on the 
Muslim communities within its wards.  A respondent talking about funding stated 
that it did cause some division within the Muslim community, but that division 
already existed.  
 
There is some acceptance of the funding streams which has provided an excellent 
opportunity for some mosques to employ intellectuals who have been able to 
provide a more informed and academic viewpoint of Islam leading the youth away 
from negative but exciting rhetoric.  The same respondent did state that to a 
degree there was an element of hypocrisy involved, where the funding became the 
central issue and different communities vied for that funding. 
    
Muslim communities report that they still feel they are the subject of Prevent 
targeting. One officer engaged in the delivery of Prevent felt that the intensive 
                                                 
120
  Hizb ut-Tahrir says it opposes terrorism and condemned the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. However, it 
regards integration as “dangerous,” orders all Muslims to keep apart from non-believers and says 
that “those [Muslims] who believe in democracy are Kafir”, or apostates. A British would-be 
suicide bomber, Omar Sharif, was radicalised partly by Hizb activists at his London university. 
121
 Gilligan, A. (2010), Hizb ut-Tahrir is not a gateway to terrorism, claims Whitehall report. The 
Telegraph. 25.07 2010. [online]  Available from:  http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalists/andrew-
gilligan/7908262/Hizb-ut-Tahrir-is-not-a-gateway-to-terrorism-claims-Whitehall-report. 
[Accessed December 2012]. 
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roll-out in some areas of Prevent had added to this feeling of concentrated 
targeting.  
 
The other adverse outcome was that there had, ‘been a lack of transparency where 
lines between Prevent and community cohesion have been blurred and that any 
lack of transparency has had the potential to lead to distrust.’  It is felt that Prevent 
and Safeguarding go hand in hand and transparency is hugely important.  
 
The national and local message cannot be clearer, that Prevent is there to target Al 
Qaeda and those organisations inspired by its rhetoric. However local feedback in 
this reporting process is that there is a fear of a growing far right wing movement 
and growth of Islamophobia across Europe which continues to create fear and 
unease amongst the Muslim communities.  One respondent stated, ‘Whilst we 
may be trying to convey a particular message to counteract extremist rhetoric, we 
can only do this by understanding the motivations of those who are attracted to 
such rhetoric - and engagement is key to this.’  Luton in particular has seen 
incredibly strong rhetoric and often violent confrontations between Muslims with 
hard line views and agendas and those diametrically opposed to those views.  
 
These extremes of the political divide continue to create collateral damage, 
division and fear amongst the Muslim and non-Muslim communities that inhabit 
the area in between. Luton saw the birth of the English Defence League as it 
morphed from The United People of Luton following the backlash of the Anglian 
Regimental homecoming parade protests in 2009. Although this seems to be 
fragmenting it is still a force that exists. 
 
Local feedback from Luton residents is that the English Defence League is not 
just a Luton issue anymore and this is certainly clear from their activities country 
wide.  As such it should be addressed within the overall national strategy. This 
echoes the findings of Choudhury and Fenwick’s 2011 report,122 where they state, 
‘.. it should be recognised that the English Defence League (EDL) are, for many 
Muslims in this research, a visible and real manifestation of violent extremism 
                                                 
122
 Choudhury. T., Fenwick H. (2011), op cit. 
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and one that many are more likely to encounter than an Al Qaida extremist.’ 
Lambert and Githens make the statement that terminology has to be guarded.  Not 
only in the general public but within official statements from the Government.
123
   
 
 
5.6        The positives around the Prevent strategy moving forward with   
            “Safeguarding.” 
 
Some Prevent engagement officers felt that Prevent has begun to lead to better 
relationships between the police and Muslim members of the community. Projects 
that have managed to be self-sustaining such as the women’s Massti, youth sports, 
singing and Mosque visits in Queens Park. The work of Police Prevent 
Engagement Officers delivering a wide range of preventative, educational and 
community engagement work has been stated as being consistent, focussed and 
lasting. 
 
There is a more pertinent dialogue with mosques, individuals and even members 
of proscribed organisations. There is what has been termed a “more adult” 
dialogue which has been seen to improve relationships. Those relationships are 
developing and there seems to be a common purpose in the safeguarding of the 
community as a whole and the Muslim members of it. Empowerment for the local 
community has allowed for a robust rebuttal of extremist viewpoints and where 
there was once a drive to push such sentiment, the local community collectively 
have been allowed to state that they are not interested and rejection has been 
successful. 
 
                                                 
123
 Lambert, R., Githens-Mazer, J. (2011),  ‘The fiery birth of the Prevent counter-terrorism 
strategy: England's Summer of Discontent, ten years on. [online] Available from:  
http://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/robert-lambert-jonathan-githens-mazer/fiery-birth-
of-prevent-counter-terrorism-strategy  [Accessed March 2012].  
 ‘The fiery birth of the Prevent counter-terrorism strategy: England's Summer of Discontent, ten 
years on. The commentary relates to Michael Gove’s insistence in labelling of Islamic terrorism as 
being inherently related to ‘Islamism' indicates the problem in official thinking on these issues. By 
saying that terrorism is the result of Islamism, he betrays a lazy indifference to the theological, 
geographic, political and contextual differences that mark a hugely diverse range of groups and 
movements, from the millenarian to the worldly political, the non-violent to the extremely violent.’ 
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Prevent 2 and especially Safeguarding, is not police specific and this has been 
seen as a really positive move forward. Through a more positive intercourse, the 
Muslim community are actively invited to influence the Prevent agenda.  
 
It is for them and from them, not at them. This specific point was felt by a Prevent 
Engagement Officer as needing much greater media attention.  The very fact that 
this Safeguarding is a partnership between the Prevent delivery teams and the 
Muslim community has to be emphasised through the media to reach all sections 
of the community. 
 
The revision of the Prevent strategy has been seen to have addressed the earlier 
criticisms; it is viewed as a changing strategy which is entirely appropriate with a 
changing community dynamic.  
 
Prevent sits within the control of the Home Office, which a respondent has stated 
makes certain aspects of it more deliverable and systematic, whilst at the same 
time losing some of its flexibility. All of these points highlight the importance of 
local delivery and understanding Luton and Bedford Prevent delivery has required 
some change to the strategy in order to ‘accommodate our own specific issues.’  
124
 
 
Addressing such issues with a local perspective has allowed the opportunity for 
better relationship building between the Muslim community and the Prevent 
delivery teams.  Anecdotally Prevent is not held up by Muslim community 
members as a praiseworthy concept but it is rather seen as ‘grudgingly accepted as 
needed.’ That is, in itself, a positive sign or at least a sign of it moving in the right 
direction. 
 
There is still an image problem.  The original branding and close counter 
terrorism association continues to create a suspicion.  Several respondents 
commented that, ‘Prevent is only one part of a much larger issue concerning 
Muslims and other ethnic groups and that is one of world inequality, poverty and 
                                                 
124
 Local respondent. 
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alienation amongst some groups/ethnicities in the UK. Cohesion will not come 
from community engagement alone, but from a narrowing of inequalities.’  
Community cohesion sets out to reduce those inequalities and is still seen as more 
important than Prevent alone. 
 
Prevent engagement has begun to lead to better relationships between the police 
and Muslim members of the community.  One member of staff stated that they 
were consulted during the Prevent review and that a “lessons learned” approach 
was adopted, allowing for a clarity of purpose, which has been seen to work well.  
There is now a more pertinent dialogue with mosques, individuals and even 
members of proscribed organisations. The relationships are developing and there 
seems to be a common purpose in the safeguarding of the community as a whole 
and the Muslim members of it. Through a more positive intercourse, the Muslim 
community are actively invited to influence the Prevent agenda 
 
One respondent stated, ‘Whilst we may be trying to convey a particular message 
to counteract extremist rhetoric, we can only do this by understanding the 
motivations of those who are attracted to such rhetoric - and engagement is key to 
this.’125  
 
Luton in particular has seen incredibly strong rhetoric and often violent 
confrontations between Muslims with hard line views and agendas and those 
diametrically opposed to those views on the far right.  These extremes of the 
political divide continue to create collateral damage, division and fear amongst the 
communities - Muslim and non-Muslim that habitat the area in between. Luton 
saw the birth of the English Defence League as it morphed from The United 
People of Luton following the backlash of the Anglian Regimental homecoming 
parade protests in 2009.  Local feedback from Luton residents is that the EDL is 
not just a Luton issue anymore and this is certainly clear from their activities 
country wide.   
 
                                                 
125
 Local Respondent 
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As such it should be addressed within the overall national strategy.  Channel has 
been broadened to include individuals from Far Right Wing groups and has been 
highlighted as an area which could be developed to cater for other areas where 
required.  
 
This certainly echoes the findings of Choudhury and Fenwick’s 2011 report, 
where they state, ‘… it should be recognised that the English Defence League 
(EDL) are, for many Muslims in this research, a visible and real manifestation of 
violent extremism and one that many are more likely to encounter than an Al 
Qaeda extremist.’ 
 
National reporting through newspapers and high profile television documentaries 
has stained Luton with an image of extremism and on-going terrorist associations.  
This compounds the feelings in the Muslim community of being under a spotlight 
for entirely the wrong reasons and is in fact being targeted by the Prevent strategy 
because of its reputation. One officer engaged in the delivery of Prevent felt that 
the intensive roll out in some areas of Prevent had added to this feeling of 
concentrated targeting. An officer reported that it was not just the Muslim 
community that felt they were subject to targeting by Prevent, but that it was seen 
as exactly that by other members of the wider community as well.  
 
Prevent was seen as a Muslim thing because Muslims were portrayed as the 
source of the problem by the media.  However a comment received, which is 
worth exploring further is that, ‘the Muslim community know and accept that 
Prevent concentrates on extremism.  This was not seen as a negative aspect as 
local Muslim communities openly disregarded much of the extremist and certainly 
the violent rhetoric anyway.   
  
The fact that little early guidance left the Prevent agenda delivery with the police 
allowed some forums to state that it was “anti-Muslim” and that the police and 
Government were victimising the Muslim community.” This went mostly 
unchallenged as the counter terrorism community rarely, if ever opened their 
doors to media approach. The other adverse outcome was that there had, ‘been a 
lack of transparency where lines between Prevent and community cohesion have 
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been blurred and that any lack of transparency has had the potential to lead to 
distrust.’  It is felt that Prevent and safeguarding go hand in hand and transparency 
is hugely important. The national and local message cannot be clearer however, 
and that it is that Prevent is there to target Al Qaeda and those organisations 
inspired by its rhetoric. 
 
However, local feedback in this reporting process is that there is a fear of a 
growing far right wing movement and growth of Islamophobia across Europe 
which continues to create fear and unease amongst the Muslim communities.  
This has been reported as being specifically prevalent within higher education 
where Muslim students are, ‘being looked at in a negative way.’   The Universities 
also felt were being asked to report and inform on non-violent extremists who 
would alienate Muslims as it targets Muslims for holding alternative views.  
 
The revision of the Prevent strategy has been seen by some Prevent deliverers to 
have addressed the earlier criticisms.  It is viewed as a changing strategy which is 
entirely appropriate with a changing community dynamic.  Prevent sits within the 
control of the Home Office, which a respondent has stated makes certain aspects 
of it more deliverable and systematic whilst at the same time losing some of its 
flexibility. All of these points highlight the importance of local delivery.  
Understanding Luton and Bedford Prevent delivery has required some change to 
the strategy in order to ‘accommodate our own specific issues.’ Addressing such 
issues with a local perspective has allowed the opportunity for better relationship 
building between the Muslim community and the Prevent delivery teams.  
 
It is felt that Prevent delivery has positively evolved from early suspicions and 
talk of a spying programme to a point where now, because of the considerable 
work to build relationships, members of the Muslim community have, ‘an 
improved understanding of the prevent objective and their role within it.’ 
Safeguarding is seen to highlight the role of Prevent being there to protect and 
support individuals who are or seen to be vulnerable to violent rhetoric and 
ideology. There clearly remains a need to identify who those individuals are and 
in order to provide the appropriate protection a strong partnership approach has to 
be implied. 
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One respondent stated that after several years of national and then local 
Government control of the strategy, with a drive from the CT side of the police 
and criticism from the media communities now need a period of time where they 
can consolidate.  They need to be given time to assess how their communities 
have developed and continue to change against social, political and economic 
difficulties without too much control from Government bodies and authorities.
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CHAPTER  6:      CONCLUSION 
 
Muslim communities remain vulnerable to radical extremist ideologues.  
Individuals or groups associating themselves with Al Qaeda inspired rhetoric use 
Islam to justify their actions against what they portray as a non-Muslim enemy, 
where a Christian/Jewish hegemony must be mistrusted and challenged.  This 
vulnerability though is one that affects non-Muslim communities as well. Other 
threats to our society make us vulnerable to individuals who are on the far-right 
extreme.  Where the first Prevent strategy appears to have been Muslim centric, 
Prevent 2 encompasses that wider issue. It is therefore more balanced and 
appropriate to the cohesion of all community groups. 
 
There are many reports of extremist within the Muslim community who although 
known and of concern to the community are not brought to the attention of then 
authorities.  But other community groups have an equal duty. Consideration needs 
to be given as to whether non-Muslim communities are networked well enough to 
be able to identify such men and women, whose views are just as damaging to 
community cohesion and on the extreme right- wing criminal violent activity. 
Muslim communities are very strong, in that they have tight community networks 
and affiliations and are often far more capable at dealing with community issues 
without the interference of local authority than non-Muslim communities. They 
may through fear and a lack of trust in the authorities, be less willing to report 
issues amongst their own. Clearly the ongoing interaction and open debate that 
exists must be at the forefront of all efforts to secure safety.  Prevent 1 started the 
process by creating wider arenas for such debate, but failed in achieving its place 
as a policy perceived as a benefit across many Muslims. The Muslim community 
has to look at itself and join together to become resilient.  It should be driving 
change and improvement.   
 
The Luton four, reported on this month, has been an investigation that covers 
some years.  There was little in the way of community tension being reported 
back around such revelations.  The four men were known for the extremist views 
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but as reported not given up to the authorities by their community.
126
  It is perhaps 
the case that at one time this news would have cause certain far right-wing activity 
and additional consternation amongst the local Muslim community.  It is also the 
case that perhaps the interaction between the authorities and the local community 
has allowed for a good communication exchange and a natural reduction of such 
tensions. The Bedfordshire Muslim community at one point seemed constantly 
embattled through internal and external pressures, right and left wing dialogue and 
extremism in its most significant and perhaps ideologically violent form.  It 
appears to be les so at present. 
 
We can see that the Muslim community across the United Kingdom faces some 
challenges, where that community is so networked and feels the impact of 
national and international events; it is for other communities to empathise with the 
fears and concerns of their neighbours.  Muslim communities, placing greater 
emphasis on religion and family hierarchical needs, amidst a wider secular 
society, have also to understand the impact that Islam may have on those who do 
not understand it or who see it as the media often portray.   
It is not surprising that within modernity it is difficult for many people to 
understand and accept how religion can have such an impact on living and psyche.  
Islam for Muslim communities does exactly that.  Where religion and culture can 
be so critical to the development of young minds it seems absolutely fundamental 
to ensure that the teachings given are correct and suitable for the development of a 
community that can thrive amidst western modernity. There is a space for 
orthodoxy and an appreciation of religious dogma and Islamic Jurisprudence, but 
it has to be understood by those wishing to practice such systems, that no 
community can stand alone.  Therefore, there must be some formal exchange of 
ideas and values which meet within the ‘mainstream’. The majority of 
communities whether Muslim or not, have other matters that impact on their daily 
lives.  Social and economic factors are generally at the forefront of all minds with 
politics and religion less so.  If cohesion is about equal values and opportunities 
across an entire community then there is enormous scope for both it and Prevent 
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to operate together.  They both have a specific purpose and equal merit. 
Community cohesion needs to be all encompassing.  It needs to be fully inclusive 
of all groups irrespective of race, religion or identity The legacy of a 
concentration on the rights of a few who have the loudest voice is one of a risen 
right-wing profile, which has added to the breakdown in community cohesion 
related issues.    
Amidst austerity measures, the funding allocated to Prevent from central and local 
Government has been dramatically reduced.  But that funding was vital at the 
outset of Prevent to establish suitable networks and platforms for Muslim 
communities to be heard and engaged with. It has raised valuable questions about 
understanding Islamic culture and provided a vehicle on which Muslims and non-
Muslims have been able to seek a common ground on which to build a caring and 
considerate community. Those communities are stronger, better linked to local 
authorities and have an ability to rebut any challenges to a peaceful way of life.  
Prevent can be see to have created an almost industrial like machine with millions 
of pounds being made available for specific activity.  Funding will always cause 
disquiet.  Those who receive and those who do not are unlikely to have a meeting 
of minds because of the perceived unfairness. The divides and pressures created 
by that funding should ebb away with time.  One respondent for this study has 
questioned the fact that when funding is available, there seems to be a drive to 
direct change and when there is no funding the community are left alone to deal 
with the issue on their own. Such spending required its own levels of maintenance 
and performance indicators.  Local authorities were asked to bid for funding 
against Prevent activity and the complaint has been that the activity may not have 
been required in the first place – but the money had to be spent!    
 
Although suspicion remains with the etymology, Prevent remains a brand- 
perhaps a toxic one, but it is unlikely to be changed.  However what we have seen 
is that locally it is not a term that is now widely used.  Officers do not introduce 
themselves as Prevent officers but rather officers and staff who work to safeguard 
the vulnerable in the community. Ongoing engagement between local authority 
partners and all sections of the Bedford and Luton communities is allowing for 
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appropriate dialogue.  Where fears and concerns over the Muslims Against 
Crusades made, they are heard and the authorities can act appropriately.  
 
Prevent appears to have reached a plateau. It is under constant review and should 
be regularly assessed against the needs and expectations of the Muslim 
community as well as the wider community as it seeks to challenge all forms of 
extremism. However, although this paper tries to provide a balanced argument for 
the strategy, it is clear from local research, that many Muslims and non-Muslims 
who have knowledge of Prevent remain highly critical of its standing as an 
intervention tool for the Muslim community of this country.  
 
The early interventions and lack of clarity expressed in local responses matches 
almost exactly those of the national findings from Innes et al, where they state 
that, ‘..in the early years Prevent policing lacked definition, method and clarity of 
purpose. Although many acknowledged that the situation has improved, Prevent 
policing still has to confront its legacy problems.
127
 
 
Certainly the criticisms far outweigh the positive aspects.  It does not seem locally 
though to have affected cohesion to an extent where it is obviously damaging.  
Luton and Bedford have extremely strong cohesion partnerships and have been 
developing these for many years.  In the face of widespread infamous association 
Luton, in particular has maintained a status quo of on-going engagement and 
management of community tension.  This, in the face of groups such as Muslims 
Against Crusades and the English Defence League, seems an extraordinary 
achievement.   Prevent effects some – not all.  It is not a panacea for all 
community issues, but should be seen as one tool in a tool box.  It has been given 
such a high profile though that it seems to be primary.  What is clear in Luton and 
Bedford, is that whilst Prevent has annoyed and continues to cause some concerns 
for some Muslims, it is unimportant for the majority of Muslims.  This also 
reflects the national findings given to us in the British Crime Survey, ‘… supports 
the contention that Prevent policing does not appear to be a trigger for widespread 
alienation and disenchantment…..Of course, this does not mean that there are not 
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individuals and groups who are more negatively disposed, only that we should not 
assume that such views are widely prevalent.’128 
 
The national policies for Prevent and community cohesion may demand similar 
outcomes within the United Kingdom.  However, as already stated, not all Muslim 
communities are the same and they certainly do not face the same pressures. 
Media scrutiny, political activism and highly politicised individuals remain pre-
disposed to negatively affect community relations.  It will have to remain the 
responsibility of those communities to reject or accept such voices.  
Specifically to the Muslim communities of Luton and Bedford, there is a strong 
foundation with full support for the community, which will allow for strong 
rejection and reduction in vulnerability.  Both towns have Muslim communities 
that have been stigmatised by events locally and nationally and they will have to 
move on from those events. Prevent will remain part of the local authority strategy 
and remains a strong focus for the police, but it has matured and changed 
according to the needs of the local community.  As one respondent from the 
Muslim community put it, ‘We need to address such issues and Prevent is the 
chosen tool to do this, it seems a necessary evil.’  
In reflecting the methodology for this research it has been difficult to reach many 
of the Muslim community members.  Consider the statement (Counter terrorism 
Officer, researching Prevent would like you to complete a Questionnaire).  That 
possibly translates to (Intelligence officer, hated strategy, seeks information).  It is 
hardly enticing even with the assurances of the ethical statements agreed by The 
University of Wales.  This was expected, but there would have been no other 
appropriate way to reach out for answers to the subject matter without remaining 
open and honest.  There is no regret in taking this stance even though it quite 
possibly reduced the opportunity for more Muslim community members to have 
been spoken to.  Further local research would perhaps be better placed, coming 
from a Muslim community member. It is going to be important that the changes to 
Prevent through the 2011 Strategy are examined in the future to establish if there 
have been successes and more acceptance. 
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Appendix 1.1 
 
Sir / Madam 
 
Polite Request for Assistance: Masters Degree in Islamic Studies 
 
I am writing to request your assistance in relation to my studies. I am reading for 
an MA at the University of Wales, Department of Theology and Islamic Studies. 
My dissertation examines if the Prevent strategy has impacted on the Muslim 
Communities of Bedford and Luton. I understand that some Muslim communities 
across the country have criticised the Strategy, whilst some have said that it does 
empower local communities to stand up against the more radical Islamist groups 
that may want to impose their own views on the rest of the Community. 
 
I have been studying Islam for three years, looking at culture, politics, religion 
and law. I would welcome your expertise with my degree in this complex subject. 
In addition to studying, I currently work full time as a Police Officer working 
across the Counter Terrorism Units of Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire 
Constabularies providing protective security advice.  Prior to this my role was to 
help develop the Prevent strategy in Hertfordshire. 
 
In addition to seeking expertise from individuals within the local Muslim 
Community, I will also be seeking the views of local police officers and other 
staff who have been engaged with the Prevent programme (Insp. Alex House and 
his Team) and as such have produced questionnaires to collate information. In 
order to comply with the ethical rules set by the University, results of my findings 
have to be publishable, non-inflammatory and non-personal. In addition, I am not 
permitted to release the names of individuals who have provided me with their 
opinions, however if there is a specific point you are keen to raise and request to 
be identified, I would be happy to consider a way forward.   
 
Martyn Ouston 27001101/1 Islamic Studies.  Dissertation 
 102 
Attached is an ethics statement outlining the academic rational behind the study 
and research aims.   The statement also outlines the importance of anonymity for 
anyone taking part and explains the process. 
 
My findings will be open to read at the University, and I intend these to be useful 
on a local level in relation to how the Prevent Strategy is delivered or altered in 
the future.   As such your views are of the upmost importance. 
 
Ultimately I am seeking an honest appraisal of the status quo along with 
recommendations from the people with the appropriate knowledge, and hope that 
you will be able to assist.  I would also be grateful for any introductions that you 
feel may be appropriate in this piece of work. 
Yours respectfully, 
 
 
Martyn Ouston  BSc.(Hons.). 
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Appendix 1.2 
 
 
Consent Form for Questionnaire Research Participation in Compliance with 
Ethics Requirements of the University of Wales. 
 
 
 
Dissertation Title: 
 
‘Has the Government Prevent Strategy been implemented effectively for the 
Muslim communities in Bedfordshire?  Do members of that community and 
practitioners view it as a positive or negative contribution to community 
cohesion, engagement and protection from vulnerability to radical 
extremism? 
 
Author:  Martyn Ouston. Hertfordshire Constabulary 
Student MA Islamic Studies. School of Theology and Islamic Studies, Trinity St. 
David’s, University of Wales. 
 
 
Academic Rationale: 
There appear to be clear arguments for and against Prevent, the government 
strategy to support the Muslim community in tackling violent extremism.  It is a 
strategy that has fallen to local authority partners to deliver. However it has 
previously been predominantly seen as a police-led agenda. District and borough 
councils, the police and criminal justice, education and the health service are all 
participating in varying degrees against varying degrees of scepticism and 
mistrust from the community that the strategy seeks to support.   
No: 
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National analysis has developed some useful commentary considering the 
strategy’s effectiveness, but locally, empirical research remains limited.  An 
understanding of Muslim views from a local context, is absolutely fundamental in 
establishing effectiveness of policy; feelings of alienation, or acceptance of 
Prevent. Once documented, these views can provide some checks and measures.  
They may direct all parties in a more positive and productive dialogue, to increase 
community resilience and cohesion. It is hoped that this paper may be used as a 
reference document for all engaged in community cohesion and Prevent and as a 
platform whereby local Muslim views can be used to redirect local policy where 
necessary. 
The purpose of this dissertation is therefore to examine the Prevent strategy and 
establish what community cohesion policies existed in Luton and Bedford for 
their Muslim communities and what if any impact Prevent has had on them.  This 
will be done by providing empirical evidence in support of either side of those 
arguments. 
 
Ethical Statement and Considerations 
 
The University of Wales is specific in its ethical requirements for this type of 
research and the below explains the ethical considerations necessary to satisfy 
those requirements.  The overall intention is to move forward effectively in 
developing a community that is cohesive, inclusive and safe and this research is 
hoped to be a positive part of that process. 
 
If suspicion towards the strategy already exists, then it is accepted by the author 
that suspicion will also exist around the questionnaires that accompany and are 
necessary to the local research.  The author is a police officer engaged within the 
counter terrorist sphere and with a specific responsibility for providing protective 
security advice.  Prior to this he was involved in the delivery of the Prevent 
strategy in Hertfordshire and has a good working knowledge of its positive and 
negative points.  Although this research will positively feed into any change 
programme, it is neither funded by nor sponsored through either Hertfordshire or 
Bedfordshire police and remains independent academic study. 
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In order to get to this stage of the research a considerable level of consultation has 
taken with the Prevent lead for Bedfordshire Police, Prevent engagement officers 
and those engaged with community cohesion.  What is missing is that empirical 
local research from Muslim community members, who have to be seen as the 
experts in how any policy or strategy has affected their personal or community 
lives.  
It is absolutely critical to the success of this research that participants feel that 
they can provide honest feedback without feeling that they are going to become 
part of some intelligence database.  The author hereby provides an absolute 
assurance that will not occur. 
 
Importantly all answers provided to the questionnaires will remain anonymous, be 
kept secure as paper only copies.  No documents will be scanned or placed onto 
electronic databases and the papers will be sealed and locked.  They will be 
destroyed after one year. 
 
This ethics form has a space which if the participant so wishes he/she can place 
their name and sign.  If they choose not to, then a simple ‘refused’ will suffice to 
indicate that the participant has read the form and understands the rationale, ethics 
and proposed outcomes.  Conversely, if the participant, wishes to speak further 
with the author that would be actively encouraged.  Either way the participants 
cannot be named or identified in any way within the research and the author will 
be responsible for ensuring the security of the forms.  It is important academically 
that the author can satisfy himself that the responses are genuine; therefore the 
questionnaire and the ethics form have a specific number assigned to them, so that 
the author can reconcile one against the other.  
 
It is for the responders to decide if they are happy for the forms to be sent back 
together directly to the author, or as separate documents.  The forms may be 
handed in the addressed envelope (sealed) to any police station. The author and 
the participant will remain sole custodians of the information provided. The 
results of the questionnaires will be summarised and a percentage will be assigned 
to questionnaire responses and the results will appear as, ‘Three per cent of the 
responders felt that……’ etc.  
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There is no conflict of interest between the policing role of the author / researcher 
and the research and outcomes of this study.  The questions are specific to what 
impact Prevent has had locally.  The researcher does not want any information 
recorded that would place any individual or group into an area where the 
responses may be construed as intelligence.   
 
If participants feel that they have matters that they wish to report to the police 
then they should do so through established channels such as Crime Stoppers, or 
speak to their local officers or community support staff. Clearly if someone states 
on questionnaire knowledge of a criminal act or intent then the author is duty 
bound to investigate the matter and that would jeopardise this research. 
 
The purpose of this dissertation is to establish if the results from some of the 
national studies find comparison in Bedfordshire.  It is expected that there may be 
criticism of Prevent, but that has been accepted in full by the government review 
process.  No person can be deemed as suspicious just because they do not agree 
with how the strategy has been delivered or have an opinion about whether it has 
damaged cohesion or enhanced it.   
 
The aims of this research are: 
 
 To explain the importance of community cohesion  and to establish by 
local research what cohesion strategies have already existed for 
communities across Bedfordshire specifically in Luton and Bedford; and 
to explain their importance for all communities especially the Muslim 
community which has a much higher than national average demographic. 
 To explain the purpose of the government Prevent Strategy; which has had 
clear implications for the Muslim communities within the United 
Kingdom. 
 To evaluate current or recent academic resources which have analysed the 
Prevent strategy in light of considerable criticism from within and without 
the Muslim community. 
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 Through empirical research, produce anonymous secure and honest 
feedback and commentary from the Bedford and Luton Muslim 
community members and those who have been engaged in the Prevent 
strategy delivery.   
 To show whether the Prevent strategy has damaged community cohesion 
in Luton and Bedford amongst the Muslim community and compare this to 
other national studies 
 To present key findings from the anonymous feedback to the local 
authority and Prevent partners to enhance the Bedfordshire Muslim 
community consultation process. 
If you are willing to participate with this survey please could you read and 
endorse the below statements.  If you prefer to remain anonymous then clearly 
your name and signature do not need to be included. 
 
1. I confirm that I have read and understand this information and that on 
the introductory letter relating to this study.  I have had the opportunity 
to consider the information, ask questions and have had these 
answered satisfactorily.  
2. I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time, without giving reason. 
3. I understand that my name will not appear in any reports, articles or 
presentations. 
I agree to take part in the study 
 
Name of Participant (if you wish to enter it)   ------------------------ Date------------- 
Signature: 
 
Researcher / Author   Martyn Ouston 
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You may decline to participate in this study.  You may end your participation in 
this study at any time.  If you decide to remain anonymous, maintaining your 
anonymity is a priority and every practical solution will be taken to disguise your 
identity.  If you prefer anonymity, there will not be any identifying information on 
this or any interview.  There are no audio interviews as part of this study.  All 
materials generated from this or any interview will remain confidential. 
 
When completed please return to the author- Martyn Ouston at Bedfordshire 
Police PO Box 4454, Dunstable LU6 9JH. 
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Appendix 1.3 
 
 
Prevent Officers / Staff Questionnaire 
 
PREVENT Questionnaire Martyn Ouston MA Islamic Studies proposed 
Dissertation Title:  
 
‘Has the Government Prevent Strategy been implemented effectively for the 
Muslim communities in Bedfordshire?  Do members of that community and 
practitioners view it as a positive or negative contribution to community 
cohesion, engagement and protection from vulnerability to radical 
extremism? 
 
 
Hello 
I spoke with some of you last year and this is a more formalised part.  Could you 
consider the below questions and if you have time can I interview you please? 
There is a letter attached and the questionnaire that I would like to be handed to 
those people in the Muslim community that you feel may be willing to help me 
out. Inspector Alex has been asked to QA this, but any problems please don’t 
hesitate to ring me.   The results of this questionnaire have to remain anonymous 
and you will not be identified as a requirement of the ethics of the University. 
Thanks  
 
 
 
Martyn Ouston 
 
Dc Martyn Ouston  martyn.ouston@bedfordshire.pnn.police.uk 07506745108 
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1. When did you first become engaged with PREVENT and what have been 
your responsibilities?  
 
 
2. What is your current role and could you please summarise how you are 
involved with PREVENT? 
 
3. What parts of the original Strategy caused you difficulties in engagement? 
 
4. Was the wording of the strategy difficult to translate into community 
cohesion if so why? 
 
5. What has been the best part of the strategy as far as enabling your work to 
continue? 
 
6. What has been the worst part of the strategy as far as creating obstacles or 
difficulties for you?  
 
7. What has been the most productive aspect of the Prevent strategy? 
 
8. What do you see as the best way forward in community engagement and 
cohesion for the Muslim communities that you work with?  
 
Any other comments 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete this questionnaire.  The results will 
remain anonymous, but the general resulting themes will be made available within 
the dissertation and available as a non-restricted document.
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Appendix 1.4 
 
 
Community members’ questionnaire 
 
PREVENT Questionnaire for Martyn Ouston MA Islamic Studies proposed  
Dissertation Title: 
 
 
‘Has the Government Prevent Strategy been implemented effectively for the 
Muslim communities in Bedfordshire?  Do members of that community and 
practitioners view it as a positive or negative contribution to community 
cohesion, engagement and protection from vulnerability to radical 
extremism? 
 
 
‘Prevent’ has affected Muslim communities far more than any one other section of 
society.  Your knowledge and understanding of it is therefore paramount. I would 
be most grateful if you could spare some time in answering the below questions.  
My address is printed in the introductory letter, but if you prefer to remain 
anonymous then please complete and return to your local police station for my 
attention. 
 
If you would like to speak with me one to one then I would welcome the 
opportunity, but for the purposes of the research you have to remain anonymous. 
The results of this questionnaire will remain anonymous. It will be categorised by 
a number which only I will know who it relates to.  If you are willing to answer 
the question but do not want to be identified I will understand and respect your 
desire for confidentiality. 
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1. Which town do you reside in? 
 
2. How long have you lived there for? 
1-5 yrs             6-10                  11+ 
 
3. In your mind what do you think is the most appropriate platform 
where you can express your opinion, views and concerns within 
the local community? 
 
4.                      Do you feel that your voice is heard within your community? 
 
5.                     Do you play an active part in your community? 
 
6.  Were you born in the United Kingdom or another country, if so 
where? 
 
7. Where did you grow up? 
 
8. It would be helpful to me to understand what it was like for you     
growing up as a young Muslim in that town.  Did you feel part of 
the community?   
 
9. Have you experienced any difficulties because of the way that the 
media has reported on Islam and Muslims?  
 
10.   Did the events of 9/11 or 7/7 affect the way you were treated or 
any of your family?  If so how? 
 
11. If you have heard of the government Prevent strategy, what does                                                                                                               
‘Prevent’  mean to you? 
 
Martyn Ouston 27001101/1 Islamic Studies.  Dissertation 
 113 
12.  Which aspects of Prevent are most problematic and has it brought 
about negative attitudes? 
 
13. Community cohesion is concerned with including all sections of 
the community across many areas including health, social services, 
education, leisure etc., whereby all communities feel integrated and 
part of a wider society.  Do you feel that the Prevent strategy has 
added to community cohesion or taken away from it?   If you can, 
please provide an example in favour and against.   
 
14.  Have you any other views on the way in which the PREVENT  
strategy should be improved if so how? 
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Appendix 2.  Demographic Data for Luton and Bedford. 
 
Demographic Explanation 
 
This section provides a demographic picture of both towns; it recognises that there 
is a considerably higher Muslim population than in other towns across the south-
east in regard to demographics.  Because of factors such as social deprivation, 
unemployment and lower education standards including language barriers; the 
Muslim community have seen themselves subject of funding.  Pathfinder and also 
activity through the Prevent strategy with regard to preventing violent 
radicalisation has meant that unlike other areas there has been concentrated efforts 
in providing support to what is considered a vulnerable community.  
A 2011 study by Mayhew and Waples of demographic change in Luton provides 
the most recent structural analysis and decomposition of the demography. 
129
It 
provides us, with updated statistics in advance of the 2011 census.  The figures 
have shown a dramatic increase in the Asian population, which far exceeds the 
expectations of earlier analysis, based on 2001 figures and is explored in more 
detail in chapter two.  Unfortunately this data does not provide analysis of faith 
orientation.  However if we take census data from 2001 Community members 
from Pakistan is 98 % of Muslims and those from Bangladesh approximately 
92%.
130
 National statistics show that the United Kingdom Muslim population has 
grown from approximately 20,000 in 1950 to around 2 million today.  
 
 
                                                 
129
 Mayhew L. & Waples S. The growth and Changing Complexion of Luton’s Population. Luton: 
(2011).  Commissioned Report for Luton council by Migration Impact Fund 
130
 The Bangladeshi Muslim Community in England Understanding Muslim Ethnic Communities.. 
The Pakistani Muslim Community in England. Understanding Muslim ethnic Communities. 
London: Change Institute. (2009) p.7. [online] Available from: 
www.communities.gov.uk/documents/communities/pdf/1170952.pd f. [accessed December 2011] 
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Luton Demographic Data 
Luton is a large town situated approximately twenty miles north of London on the 
M1.  It is one of the largest towns in the south-east of England and is also one of 
the most densely populated areas outside of London.  Many residents have strong 
network links to other Muslim communities in London, Peterborough 
Birmingham and Leeds.  
. 
Although the population was seen in the 2001 census as being 184,000, that was 
expected to have risen to 186,500 by 2011, the recent Audit Commission report 
estimates a population of 186,200 living in 71,000 households. The Black and 
Asian population shown in 2001 at 28% far exceeds the national average and that 
has been amended recently to show approximately 38% compared with an average 
of 15 % across England. Within this ethnic grouping, Pakistani and Kashmiri 
residents are estimated at 10%, African Caribbean residents (7%) Indian (4%) and 
Bangladeshi (4%),.These numbers have been bolstered with a significant eastern 
European and West African population… many of these are Muslim and the 
Town has a significant number of Mosques.
131
 
 
Data showing the numbers of Muslims per capita head for Luton based on 2001 
census data placed Luton as the sixth highest concentration of Muslim in the 
United Kingdom with 27,000 Muslims representing (15% of population.)  The 
highest figure was Tower Hamlets - 71,000 (36% of population).
132
 
The most contemporary data collated by Mayhew and Waples,
133
 show that 
Luton’s total population is 202,748 (January 2011).  There has been an increase in 
the diversity amongst the population and a growth in the Asian population from 
33,600 to 50,200. The 2011 data shows that thin the Asian sub-groups, Pakistanis 
are the largest group with nearly 25,000 members.   
                                                 
131
 Audit Commission (2004). The Journey to race equality. HMSO: ISBN:186240 477 1 
GXB3160.  London: HMSO The Journey to race equality Audit Commission. 
132
  Greene, R. et al (2011) op cit. 
133
 Mayhew L.& Waples S., op. cit. 
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This is closely followed by the Bangladeshi community with over 13,000 
members.  Indian and other sub-continent categories make up the remainder, 
which are still more sizeable than many other non-Asian groups.  There has also 
been a very high ‘turnover’; in that population with an estimated 50% - 75% 
having not lived or been born in Luton at the time of the 2001 census.   
That is in itself a critical factor when considering the impact community 
engagement policy has on the community.  Members of the Muslim community 
who were considered for engagement or cohesion programmes from 2001 to 2005 
clearly now cannot be considered as representative of the Muslim community as a 
whole.  Ergo continuing and evolving engagement is going to be necessary to 
ensure that engagement and cohesion reaches the greatest numbers of community 
members. 
 
Bedford Demographic Data 
Bedford Borough has an ethnically diverse population. In 2001, 19.2% of the 
population was from minority ethnic groups (BME), compared to 13% nationally, 
and as with Luton, there has been an increase since 2001 due to significant 
international immigration. The BME population is largely concentrated in the 
urban area of Bedford and Kempston with particularly large BME communities in 
Queens Park (57.8% in 2001) and Cauldwell (43.6%) wards. 
134
  In 2001 there 
were seen to be up to 100 different ethnic groups living within its council 
boundary.  
The Asian community in Bedford using 2001 data shows Asian or Asian British - 
Indian 6,335  which is 4.3% of the population compared to England 2.1%.  Asian 
or Asian British - Pakistani 2,350 which is 1.6% compared to 1.4% as an average 
for England.  Asian or Asian British - Bangladeshi 2,023 1.4% 0.6% England
135
 
In relation to terms of inequality, Bedford falls in to line with national statistics in 
that the last thirty years study has shown three groups below retirement age 
                                                 
134
 Bedford Borough Council statistical data October 2011 
135
 Bedford Borough Council statistical data October 2011 
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which’ stand out as facing particularly large and persistent employment 
disadvantages or penalties. These are disabled people, mothers and Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi women. All three of these groups are significantly more likely to be 
out of work regardless of their qualifications or where they live.
136‘It is estimated 
that there are currently around 4,780 adults with a learning disability in Central 
Bedfordshire. This is expected to increase to 6,050 by 2030, Black, Pakistani and 
Bangladeshi households are more likely to live in homes that fall below the 
Decent Homes Standard than white households.’137 
 
 
                                                 
136
 Evidence Base for the Sustainable Community Strategy 2010-2031 cited statistics from  Cabinet 
Office, Fairness and Freedom: the final report of the Equalities Review, (2007) 
137
 Audit Commission (2004). The Journey to race equality. HMSO: ISBN:186240 477 1 
GXB3160.  London: HMSO The Journey to race equality Audit Commission (2004 
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Appendix 3     The CONTEST Strategy 
 
The Government’s counter-terrorism strategy was launched in April 2003 and has 
recently been updated to reflect the changing terrorist threat and incorporate new 
Government policies on counter-terrorism. 
The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests overseas 
from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with confidence. 
The scope of the revised CONTEST strategy has been broadened to cover all 
forms of terrorism. Therefore certainly for Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire as 
collaborated Police Services, CONTEST also incorporates Domestic Extremism 
and Irish Related terrorism within the strategy.  
The strategic goal of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests 
overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely and with 
confidence. 
The strategy continues to be organised around four work streams, each comprising 
a number of key objectives: 
Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks 
Prevent: to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism 
Protect: to strengthen our protection against a terrorist attack 
Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a terrorist attack 
For the updated CONTEST strategy please see 
 
 
 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/publications/counter-terrorism/counter-
terrorism-strategy//  
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End. 
